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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM, 
Deceased. 
MAXINE TATE GRIM, individually 
and as Supervised Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Edward Miller Grimm; LINDA 
GRIMM; EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II; 
and E. LAVAR TATE, as Supervised 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm, Case No. 860262 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, REX ROBERTS, 
JUANITA GRIMM MORRIS, and 
JUANITA KEGLEY GRIMM, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement were 
binding upon the Plaintiffs. 
A. Whether the Family Settlement Agreement was a legal 
contract which did not require court approval to bind the signing 
parties. 
B. Whether the Plaintiffs are equitably prevented from 
repudiating the terms of the Family Settlemeint Agreement. 
2. Whether the lower court was correct in concluding that the 
alleged spendthrift trust did not affect the validity of the Family 
Settlement Agreement or the ability of the court to approve it. 
A. Whether the inter vivos trust is merely illusionary 
and contains no assets. 
B. Whether Plaintiffs have renounced any interest in it 
and are estopped from claiming under it. 
C. Whether Section 75-3-1101 U.C.A. makes a family settle-
ment agreement binding upon the parties even if it affects a trust 
or inalienable interest. 
D. Whether it can be said that the termination of the 
trust is in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
3. Whether proper notice was given to necessary parties to 
Section 75-3-1102 (c) therefore making approval of the Family Settle-
ment Agreement proper. 
4. Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on the 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, duress, and 
failure of consideration. 
A. Whether - under Philippine law there is a cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional harm. 
B. Whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs produced suf-
ficient evidence to state claim. 
C. Whether Plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of right 
to have a jury decide these issues and whether the lower court 
correctly ruled in favor of the Defendants based upon all of the 
evidence. 
D. Whether Plaintiffs waived any right they had to a jury 
by their conduct. 
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5. Whether the lower court correctly applied the evidence in 
this case in concluding that there was adequate consideration ex-
changed between the parties. 
A. Whether this Court should adopt a "good faith" standard 
in evaluating the adequacy of considerations in family settlement 
agreements. 
B. Whether the evidence in this case supports a finding 
of good faith as well as bona fide claims. 
6. Whether the Findings of the lower court comply with Rule 
52 U.R.C.P. and provide an adequate basis for appellate review. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Whether the lower court erred in failing to award Defendants 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to enforce the Family Settlement 
Agreement. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Three sections of the Uniform Probate Code are pertinent to this 
appeal—Section 75-3-912, 75-3-1101 and 75-3-1102. These sections 
are set forth in the Addendum to this Brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants incorporate those portions of the Nature of the Case 
contained in Appellants' Brief (Appellants' Brief, pp. 5-10) which 
relate to the sequence of procedural events. Defendants do not 
incorporate those portions of the text which editorialize or which 
emphasize procedural events for the benefit of the Plaintiffs. As 
to this cross appeal it should also be noted that the lower court 
denied Defendants' claim for attorneys' fees (CR 1256) and that a 
timely appeal was taken from that order (CR 1271) . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants have presented a lengthy and colorful 
"Statement of Facts" in their Brief. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 10-31). 
The picture painted by Appellants is that of two sisters and their 
respective husbands who would virtually stop at nothing to intimidate 
and coerce Maxine Grimm and her children into agreeing to give the 
scheming daughters a much larger percentage of the Edward Grimm 
estate than they could ever possibly hope to obtain by any legal or 
ethical course of conduct. In desperation the appellants were 
finally driven to the breaking point, according to this scenario, 
and reluctantly agreed to enter into the Family Settlement Agreement 
to their great detriment and sorrow. AppelLants conclude this story 
by showing that the defendants continued to make life miserable for 
them and finally after regaining their strength and resolve the 
plaintiffs repudiated the Family Settlement Agreement and sought 
judicial relief from the document which they acknowledged they all 
signed. 
This "Statement of Facts" would have made an excellent outline 
for a closing statement to a fact finder. It basically includes all 
of the direct evidence favorable to the plaintiffs' position and, in 
addition, takes every opportunity to make innuendos and insinuations 
as to any implied evidence or conclusions. While Plaintiffs maintain 
that their Statement focuses "on the documentary exhibits and the 
testimony of the defendants and their witnesses" (Appellants1 Brief, 
p. 11), a review of their citations shows this is incorrect. A 
majority of the references utilized in the Statement of Facts refer 
to testimony of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs1 witnesses, or the 
plaintiffs' exhibits. 
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Defendants maintain that while the "Statement of Facts" sub-
mitted by the plaintiffs contain an entertaining version of the 
facts as viewed by the plaintiffs during the many years that this 
controversy developed, it is nonetheless an improper view for purposes 
of this appeal. Even in equity cases, as loi|ig as there is substantial 
evidence to support the findings of the lowea 
view the findings favorably and not substitute its own judgment 
except to prevent manifest injustice if the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against the Court's findings. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 
t court, this Court must 
1017 (Utah 1982); Provo City v. Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978) . 
Material which was not 
With this standard of appellate review jLn mind, Defendants shall 
rely upon the Findings of Fact entered by the lower court as to 
Findings 1 through 64. The additional findings of the lower court 
will be cited during the Argument portion of I the Brief. In addition, 
supplementary material will be added to the tindinas in order to 
I 
clarify certain of the events and to refute ^ome of the allegations 
contained in Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts 
originally found in the Findings of the lowetr court will be included 
in brackets [] with the exception of the subheadings used throughout 
the Statement of Facts which are not found in the original court 
Findings. The transcript and record designation utilized by the 
appellants in their Brief will be utilized hbre (Appellants1 Brief, 
p. 9) and, in addition, the name of the witn|ess giving the testimony 
will be inserted for further clarification. 
The Early Grimm Family History 1)929-1958 
1. On February 22, 19 26, Edward Miller] 
defendant Juanita Kegley Grimm (JUANITA) . [| 
They resided in the Philippine Islands from 
Grimm (GRIMM) married 
Juanita Grimm, TRB 111]. 
1926 until 1937. [Juanita 
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Grimm, TRB 110-112]. Two children were born of that marriage, 
defendant Ethel Grimm Roberts (ETHEL), born in 1928, and defendant 
Juanita Grimm Morris (NITA), born in 1930. [Id.]. 
2. In 19 37, defendants JUANITA, ETHEL and NITA moved to San 
Francisco. [Id.]. GRIMM remained in the Philippine Islands and 
later served in the U.S. Army in the South Pacific. (Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 18-19]. 
3. In 1945, plaintiff Maxine Tate Grimm (MAXINE), employed 
as a Recreational Director by the American Red Cross, met GRIMM in 
the Philippines. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 11]. [During this time period 
Grimm served as a Colonel for General Douglas MacArthur's staff and 
was responsible for sea logistics. (Id.)]. 
4. In 1947, without personally contacting JUANITA, GRIMM came 
to the United States and filed a Complaint for Divorce in Reno, 
Nevada (PX-1). [PX-2, 3]. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 15; Juanita Grimm 
Morris, TRB 112-113] . 
5. GRIMM came to Nevada, established residency for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a divorce and, other than meeting the divorce 
residency requirement, GRIMM was never an actual resident of Nevada. 
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 4 22]. 
6. On June 2, 194 7, a Decree of Divorce was entered, divorcing 
JUANITA and GRIMM (PX-3). Three weeks later, on June 25, 1947, GRIMM 
and MAXINE were married in Tooele, Utah. [PX-5]. 
7. Following the marriage, GRIMM and MAXINE returned to the 
Philippines. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 18]. They maintained homes in the 
Philippine Islands and Tooele, Utah, which homes they could occupy 
when not traveling. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 28]. They occupied the home 
in the Philippine Islands most of the time except for the last two 
-6-
years of GRIMMfS life when the Grimms spent more time in Tooele, 
Utah. [Id.]. GRIMM died November 27, 1977, in the Philippine 
Islands. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 75]. [During this entire period of 
time Grimm remained an American citizen. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 9)]. 
8. Two children were born to GRIMM and MAXINE, Edward Miller 
Grimm II (PETE), born in 19 51, and Linda Grimm Lawyer (LINDA), born 
in 1953. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 10]. I 
I 
9. In 1947, ETHEL, GRIMM'S daughter by his first marriage, 
returned to the Philippines. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 26]. She married 
Pat McFadden, an employee of GRIMM. [Id.]. They had six children 
by that marriage. She divorced Mr. McFadden and married Rex Roberts 
after 1947. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 27]. 
10. After the Second World War, GRIMM rebuilt and developed 
his various businesses. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 19]. [A large part of 
this effort was made with his long-time partner Charles Parsons. 
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-21) . Through their combined effort they 
established businesses in maritime shipping throughout the Philippines, 
Hong Kong and Japan. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-22) . In addition, Grimm 
owned an American company established in Utah called Globe Investment 
Company. (DX-272)]. 
The Later Years of Edward Grimm 1959-1977 
11. In 1959, GRIMM executed two wills prepared by a lawyer in 
California. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 214]. The first will was referred to 
as the Non-Philippine Will (PX-6). The second will was referred to 
as the Philippine Will (PX-7). In general, under the Philippine Will 
ETHEL and NITA would receive that portion of the estate to which they 
would be entitled under Philippine law if they were compulsory heirs. 
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 41]. Under the Non-Philippine Will, ETHEL and 
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NITA would receive nothing. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 40]. 
[Plaintiffs describe the "Law of Legitime11 in their Brief as 
that peculiar doctrine under Philippine law which requires compulsory 
inheritance of certain heirs. They then continue with the statement 
that this law of legitime was not applicable "to Mr. Grimm1s estate 
regardless of whether he was domiciled in Utah or in the Philippines." 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 14). This conclusion rests upon the testimony 
of Emilio Benavince, a Philippine lawyer, who testified on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. The statement contained in Appellants1 Brief is 
correct as far as it goes. However, upon cross-examination Mr. 
Benavince acknowledged that the doctrine of renvoi (a principle used 
in conflict of law disputes) is applicable in the Philippines. A 
telegram sent by an attorney retained by Maxine Grimm in 1978 con-
cluded that if the doctrine of renvoi applied, then the Philippine 
courts would apply the Philippine law of succession even if that were 
inconsistent with Utah law. (DX-253). Thus, while Appellants in 
their Statement of Facts present the question of legitime law as one 
without dispute, the evidence is to the contrary and the arguments 
presented by Defendants1 trial counsel illustrate the substantial 
question raised under the conflict of law rule. (TRB 771-779)]. 
12. After 1959, assets situated outside the Philippines became 
significantly greater. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 215-216]. In 1964, GRIMM 
organized Globe Investment Company, essentially a holding company 
for real properties located in the United States. [DX-272]. In 
addition, Globe had a wholly-owned subsidiary, Proud Porker Ranch, a 
hog farm in Tooele, Utah (DX-272, PX-12). [Maxine Grimm, TRA 177]. 
On the other hand, Luzon Stevedoring was sold in 1964 and Everett 
Steamship Lines in 19 76, both substantial companies owned by GRIMM 
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and Charles Parsons. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 24, 216]. 
13. In the summer of 1976 [sic], GRIMM came to Utah for medical 
treatment. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 44]. While in Utah, he caused a trust 
agreement to be prepared. [PX-11; Maxine Grimm, TRA 44]. 
14. On July 12, 19 77, GRIMM executed the Trust Agreement naming 
PETE Trustee and MAXINE, PETE and LINDA as beneficiaries. [PX-11, 
Maxine Grimm, TRA 45-4 8]. When the Trust Agreement was executed, the 
only assets purportedly transferred to the Trustee were the share of 
Globe Investment Company (PX-8). [PX-11, Pete Grimm, TRB 439-442]. 
15. In July of 1977, GRIMM returned to the Philippines. [Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 52]. He was not in good health and from September through 
November of 1977 his health deteriorated to the point that death was 
imminent. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 54-57]. 
16. On August 16, 1977, certain assignments were executed by 
GRIMM purporting to place most Philippine assets of GRIMM in trust 
(PX-14, 15). [PX-16 through PX-55; Maxine Gpimm, TRA 53; Pete Grimm, 
TRB 443-450]. [The transfer of the Globe Investment Company stock 
was also reflected in the stock ledgers of the company on July 12, 
1977, and a new stock certificate was issued and delivered to Pete 
as Trustee. (PX-12; PX-13)]. 
17. It is questionable if the assignments were in fact properly 
delivered to the Trustee because PETE testified that he placed the 
assignments in his dad's safety deposit box which was in the name of 
E. M. Grimm. [Pete Grimm, TRB 541]. In October or November of 1977 
but prior to GRIMM1S death, MAXINE took the contents out of GRIMM'S 
safety deposit box and placed the contents in a safety deposit box 
in her name. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 223-225; Pete Grimm, TRB 542]. It 
was not until after the death of GRIMM that she placed the Trustee's 
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name on the box. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 225]. PETE wrote on November 
14, 1977, "Before transferring them (stocks) I think we should get 
their (Kirton, McConkie) opinion" (DX-302). [Pete Grimm, TRB 544-47]. 
18. As previously stated, GRIMM sold his interest in Everett 
Steamship Company in 1976. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 216]. At the time of 
his death on November 27, 1977, GRIMM was owed three payments of 
$984,092.31 each, due June 30, 1978, June 30, 1979, and June 30, 1980 
(DX-272, p. 9). [Maxine Grimm, TRA 345]. GRIMM made no effort to 
transfer the Everett receivable or certain land located in Daggett 
County, Utah, to the Trust. [Pete Grimm, TRB 449]. 
Events Surrounding Edward Grimm's Death 
October-December 197 7 
19. On October 1, 19 77, GRIMM entered Makati Medical Center 
where he remained until his death. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 56]. During 
that time, his medical condition steadily deteriorated. [Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 57]. Prior to October 19 77, the relationship between ETHEL and 
REX on the one hand, and GRIMM, MAXINE, PETE and LINDA on the other 
hand, was cordial, friendly and close; they were all supportive and 
helpful of one another during GRIMM1S last illness. [Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 59, 243; Ethel Roberts, TRA 483-84; Rex Roberts, TRB 921-22, 
Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1080]. 
20. NITA'S relationship with her father and with MAXINE, PETE 
and LINDA also was a good relationship. [Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 
1080] . 
21. In November 1977, just prior to GRIMM1S death NITA visited 
her father in the Makati Medical Center. [Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 
10 80]. Her trip from California was paid for by MAXINE. [Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 60]. 
22. While NITA was in the Philippines, she also visited with 
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Charles Parsons and his wife. [Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1081] . 
Mr. Parsons was a business associate, friend, and partner of GRIMM 
in several business ventures located in the Philippines and in Hong 
Kong, including G-P & Co., FEMOLA and Hong Kong Transportation Co. 
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 20-21] . During that visit, NITA was informed by 
Parsons that there was a trust in existence cind that it was unfavorable 
to ETHEL and NITA. [Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1082]. 
[Juanita Grimm Morris testified that as she began to think of 
the inflection in Mr. Parsons1 voice as he told her about the trust 
agreement, she began to cry hysterically. She reported this conversa-
tion to Ethel, at which time a meeting was arranged with Maxine con-
cerning the trust. On November 7 a meeting occurred with Juanita, 
Ethel and Maxine, at which time the two sisters were allowed to review 
a copy of the Trust Agreement and Maxine promised she would have one 
made for them. (Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1082-85) . Ethel Roberts 
testified that Maxine did not supply them with a copy of the Trust or 
its listed assets and that therefore on November 17, 1977 she wrote a 
letter to Maxine requesting a copy of the Trust and asset list. In 
her letter she stated that "it is a shock to Nita and me to learn 
about your Trust, which I understand deliberately eliminates her 
completely and includes me for $10,000. Is this a fair and proper 
share of my father's estate?" (PX-70). (A copy of this exhibit is 
included in the Addendum to the Brief). Ethel Roberts stated that it 
was not her intent to put pressure upon Mrs. Grimm but only to obtain 
a copy of the Trust Agreement. She testified she was not asking 
Maxine for a large portion of the estate but merely the opportunity 
to look at the Trust Agreement. (Ethel Roberts, TRA 498-500)]. 
[On November 7, 19 77 Maxine Grimm sent a letter to Bob Morris, 
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Nita's husband, thanking him for allowing her to come and visit. 
In the letter she stated: 
I especially appreciate her leveling with me. 
The trouble with all of us, Bob, is that we get 
so involved in our own hurt and problems that we 
forget others have them too. I should have known 
this about Nita without her having to say it. It's 
hard to face yourself when you know how wrong you 
have been. Fortunately we can all change. I hope 
from now on that we can be a very clos€> family. 
* * * 
Thanks for being so patient with ctll of us 
and so good to Nita and being so good yourself. 
Love you Bob, 
Maxine 
(DX-286). (A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to 
the Brief)]. 
23. During GRIMMfS last illness MAXINE had consulted with 
Britt McConkie, who was in the Philippine Islands for the L.D.S. 
Church and who was also a mebmer of the law firm of Kirton, McConkie, 
Boyer & Boyle [Maxine Grimm, TRA 230-231]. [In order to appease 
NITA and ETHEL'S concern about distribution of the estate, Maxine 
Grimm decided that new testamentary papers should be prepared for her 
husband. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 246)]. 
24. In November 1977, before GRIMM'S death, MAXINE directed 
PETE, who was then residing in Utah, to consult with Mr. McConkie's 
law firm in Utah and have documents prepared which would treat ETHEL 
and NITA equally with PETE and LINDA, and give MAXINE one-half of 
GRIMM'S estate. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 233, 246; Pete Grimm, TRB 453; 
Linda Grimm, TRB 426-27]. 
25. Pursuant to MAXINE'S direction, PETE conferred with the 
law firm of Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle. [Pete Grimm, TRB 544]. 
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PETE reported his conference to GRIMM, MAXINE and LINDA by letter 
dated November 14, 1977 (DX-302). [Pete Grimm, TRB 545-47]. [The 
November 14 letter expresses Pete's concern that he is unable to find 
a "Philippine Will" which is referenced in the Utah Will which he had 
in his possession. In the letter he also states: 
The lawyer here is talking as if the estate could 
come under the laws of (the Philippines)—(not Utah as 
King had proposed)--and if that's the case, Mom probably 
already owns one-half of everything. . . that's where 
there could be problems with a trust with transferring 
those stocks to my name right away. Before transferring 
them I think we should get their (Kirton & McConkie's) 
opinion. 
(DX-30 2). (A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to 
the Brief)]. New documents were prepared in accordance with MAXINE'S 
direction. [Pete Grimm, TRB 545]. These documents were sent to the 
Philippines but did not arrive before GRIMM'S death on November 27, 
1977. [Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 426]. 
[On November 2 8 Ethel Roberts invited Linda over for lunch. 
Linda told Ethel that they had found a will in Utah but were not sure 
what it contained. (Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 417)]. 
Maxine Returns to Utah - Dec. 1977 - Jan 1978 
26. On December 1, 1977, the day before MAXINE and LINDA left 
for Tooele, Utah, to attend the funeral, REX and ETHEL visited to say 
goodbye. [Rex Roberts, TRB 925]. At that meeting, they inquired 
about a will. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 246]. MAXINE denied any knowledge 
of a will and, in her own words, "blew up." [Maxine Grimm, TRA 121, 
247; Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 417] . It was a very emotional time for 
all involved and a very emotional meeting. [Linda Grimm Lawyer, 
TRB 416, Rex Roberts, TRB 926]. 
[While on the plane Linda wrote Ethel a letter. This letter 
said in part: 
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I wanted to write and thank you for all the help 
you gave Mom and Dad while Dad was in the hospital, 
especially before I came. I had intended to write you 
from Utah, but before I got a chance to I was in Manila. 
I also want to thank you for inviting me over for lunch. 
I really enjoyed it—and the talk we had. 
I asked Mom why she told you she knew nothing about 
a 1959 will after I had already told you I knew Pete had 
found one. She actually didn't remember anything about 
it. So, I don't want you to think she didn't want you 
to know about it. I think all the pressure was building 
up. I will have Pete send you what info we find as soon 
as we get things straightened around. 
(PX-73). (A copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)]. 
27. While en route to Utah, MAXINE wrote a letter to ETHEL 
which said, in part: 
Dearest ETHEL -
Please forgive me for blowing up—I was so ashamed. 
. . . I am also sorry about all the mix-up on the will bit. 
[I don't really think I knew what I was saying. I am still 
confused over it so I shall wait until I get to Utah and 
write you from there.] . . . . 
[I just hope we can be the best of friends. I plan 
to spend more time in Manila and I really need your 
friendship and help.] 
[I never realized until yesterday the impact of your 
feeling about disinheritance. I wish now I had insisted 
on knowing more. You have already learned this lesson. If 
you recall, you were the one to warn me.] 
[I was so sure your daddy would live to straighten out 
all the problems. Perhaps he died so we could become big 
enough to solve them ourselves. I am sure we can.] 
Thanks so much for your support during those trying 
days. 
Love, 
Maxine 
(DX-202). IA copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief]. 
The letter is indicative of MAXINE'S desire to continue harmon-
ious family relationships with ETHEL'S family. 
28- MAXINE also wrote REX, ETHEL'S husband, thanking him for 
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all his help in the past and then. (DX-287). [The letter stated 
that Mrs. Grimm was grateful for Mr. Roberts1 taking care of Linda 
the night before and that she was sorry that he was in the middle 
of all the problems but indicated she felt that when you marry into 
a family you marry their problems as well. She thanked him for 
giving Ethel and their children the feeling of security they needed 
so badly. She thanked him for his help and support and stated she 
could never have made it without all of his help. In closing she 
asked him to check the lock on the bodega by the back stairs while 
she was away. (DX-28 7). (A copy of which is attached to the Addendum 
to the Brief). (Maxine Grimm, TRA 248-252)], 
29. During December 19 77, the relationship between MAXINE, 
ETHEL, REX, NITA, LINDA and PETE was still cordial but strained due 
to the emergence of the trust, whose terms were not favorable to 
ETHEL and NITA. [Linda Grimm Lawyer, TRB 432] . Correspondence and 
communications were sent and received during the month of December 
also showing a desire on behalf of all family members to resolve the 
matter amicably. (PX-75, PX-76, PX-77, PX-78). [Copies of these 
exhibits are attached to the Addendum to the Brief; (Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 85-89)]. 
30. ETHEL was appointed Special Administratrix by the Philippine 
court on January 12, 1978, which was in accord with Mr. Salisbury's 
[sic] recommendation. (PX-80). [Ethel Roberts, TRA 503, 521, TRB 
1040-43; Rex Roberts, TRB 636]. On January 18, ETHEL wrote MAXINE 
reporting her temporary appointment and informing MAXINE of the 
hearing date when a regular administrator would be appointed. (PX-81). 
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 92-93)]. [The letter from ETHEL to MAXINE read, 
in part: 
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I went to consult some lawyers as you advised and 
they told me it would be best for all of us to have someone 
in control here. Accordingly I have been appointed Special 
Administratrix in the Philippines. All the heirs are 
represented. It has been difficult for me as I have had 
no answer from you as to my queries. The hearing will be 
March 13. I hope you will be able to be here before. 
* * * 
I truly hope Maxine, and Pete and Linda, that we 
can come up with a fair and equitable solution to satisfy 
all of us. I am saddened to think that you never con-
sidered us as being equally Daddy's children. I never 
thought of it any other way. 
With Love, 
Ethel 
(PX-81). (A copy of which is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)]. 
[Ethel Roberts testified that frequently while her father and 
Mrs. Grimm were out of the country she and her husband would perform 
periodic checks upon the residence. She testified that they became 
concerned about the safety of the valuables in the house because of 
the presence of robbers in the area and inadequate guards at the 
residence, as well as the absence of any responsible person living 
in the house. (Ethel Roberts, TRB 17-21). Rex Roberts further testi-
fied that during this period of time he placed additional barbed wire 
across the front of the compound and erected a high barricade across 
the front also. He also extended the wall on the western side of the 
compound and built a four- or five-foot extension so no one could 
walk around one compound to the other. Finally, he erected a flood-
light at the corner. (Rex Roberts, TRB 948) . He stated he had reason 
to fear for the security of the possessions in the premises for the 
reasons stated by his wife, and also was afraid that the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (the IRS in the Philippines) was going to come into 
the home and take an inventory without Mrs. Grimm's being present. 
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(Id. TRB 928) . Maxine Grimm acknowledged in her testimony that she 
had written Exhibit 287 asking the Robertses to check on the security 
of the house and that she expected the Robertses to look after the 
house while she was gone. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 248-52). She also 
admitted that there were problems with the guards sleeping on the 
job at her residence. (Id. TRA 268)]. 
The Dispute Begins - Jan. 1978 - Feb. 1978 
[While Mrs. Grimm was in Utah, and after receiving PX-81 informing 
her of Ethel's appointment as temporary Administratrix, Maxine con-
tacted David Salisbury, a partner in the firm of VanCott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy. She reported to Mr. Salisbury the conversations 
she had had with Ethel prior to the time she left the Philippines and 
also showed him the letter she had received from Ethel. (Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 100)]. 
31. On January 24, 1978, ETHEL and REX visited MAXINE1S house 
in the Philippines and, without the express permission of MAXINE, 
removed certain valuables from the house for safekeeping. [Rex Roberts, 
TRB 930-33; Ethel Roberts, TRB 17-27]. An inventory was prepared of 
all items removed. (PX-85, 86). [PX-82; Ethel Roberts, TRB 22-25]. 
After learning of the appointment and the removal of items from her 
home, Mr. Salisbury prepared a cable to ETHEL objecting to the appoint-
ment and made demand that items taken from the house be returned. 
(PX-88). [Maxine Grimm, TRA 115-17]. 
[After Mrs. Grimm returned to the United States, Ethel consulted 
with a non-practicing lawyer friend named Mr. Ilisorio. She told him 
that she did not know what the situation was as to her fatherfs estate 
and had asked Maxine for any wills but had been ignored. She told him 
that she knew Maxine had been transferring assets from the safety 
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deposit boxes which included stock deposits. She told him that she 
was personally asked to provide food for the pigs and monkey food for 
the Grimm house, since there was no money for the pearl farm or the 
household expenses. She asked what her position was and what she 
should do. Mr. Ilisorio advised her to consult with the law firm of 
Dean Reyes. He advised her that in order to obtain control of the 
situation, the quickest option was to swear that there was no will in 
existence since she had not personally seen it. He told her that this 
petition could always be changed if a will was found. (Ethel Roberts, 
TRA 502-03, TRB 1040-43). She stated, contrary to the assertion made 
in Appellants1 Brief at page 19, that while she was aware her father 
had a permanent resident visa in the Philippines she did not know 
whether Maxine had one or not. (Ethel Roberts, TRB 15). It is also 
interesting to note that while Appellants observe that Ethel later 
amended the petition to allege that Maxine indeed was a resident of 
the Philippines "precisely contrary to her perjurious allegation" 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 19), they fail to point out that Maxine joined 
in the amended petition on the basis that no will had been found and 
that the Philippine estate was ultimately settled as if no wills 
existed. (DX-214). (Pete Grimm, TRB 559). Thus, it is apparent 
that all the parties to the estate made an effort to obtain the best 
advantage possible to preserve the estate and to minimize the effects 
of probate.] 
32. By January 31, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had been made aware by 
MAXINE of an income tax case concerning GRIMM'S taxes pending before 
the U.S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., which was being handled by Mr. 
Bert Rand for GRIMM prior to GRIMM'S death. [DX-252; Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 102]. 
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33. In January and February 1978, Mr, Salisbury was informed 
and discussed with MAXINE the fact that for Philippine estate tax 
purposes, the estate of non-citizen domicilaries of the Philippines 
included all property of the deceased, real or personal, tangible 
or intangible wherever situated, except real estate located outside 
the Philippines and that the tax rate was 60 percent. (PX-272). 
[sic] [DX-253; David Salisbury, TRB 100]. 
34. In January or February 1978, Mrs. Maxine Grimm retained a 
lawyer in the Philippine Islands, Mr. Edgardo J. Angara. [David 
Salisbury, TRB 99]. Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Ahgara exchanged telegrams 
and conversed by telephone about the numerous questions concerning 
the estate, including GRIMM1S domicile and the effect of Philippine 
domicile, the law of legitime by which children are compulsory heirs, 
and its effect on the trust, the Civil Law doctrine of collation, 
the assets subject to taxation in the Philippines and the doctrine 
of renvoi as applied to succession from persons having citizenship 
different from their domicile. [PX-174, DX-£43, 254; David Salisbury, 
TRB 100-101, 276-78]. 
On February 17, 1978, Mr. Angara telegr^mmed Mr. Salisbury as 
follows: 
Please advise us, therefore, whether the disposition 
made by the decedent in his Philippine will in accordance 
with Philippine Law are contrary to Utah law. 
(HH) We would also like to know from you whether 
there is a conflict of law rule in Utah providing that 
the law of a domicile of the decedent shall govern 
successional rights. If there is such a rule, and the 
Philippines is held to be the domicile of the decedent 
at the time of his death, the Philippine courts will 
accept the renvoi or the reference back to Philippine 
law, in which case the testamentary dispositions of the 
late Mr. Grimm in his Philippine will in accordance with 
the Philippine law even if inconsistent with Utah law 
will be valid and operative. 
-19-
(II) We now turn to the legal effects of the trust 
agreement executed by the late Mr. Grimm. Under Philip-
pine law, properties transferred to a trust where the 
trustor retains the power to revoke are included as part 
of the gross estate in determining the net estate subject 
to estate tax. Furthermore, such trust properties are 
subject to collation in determining the compulsory legi-
times of the heirs. Thus, if the transfer in trust affects 
the legitimes of the heirs, such transfer shall be accord-
ingly reduced; otherwise, the properties held by the 
trustee will be left intact. 
(FF) Under Philippine law, the order of succession, 
the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity 
ot the national law of the decedent, whatever may be 
the nature of the property and regardless of the country, 
wherein said property may be found, with respect to an 
American citizen, the applicable law will be that of 
the state where he is a citizen. In the case of the 
late Mr. Grimm, we assume that he was a citizen of the 
State of Utah at the time of his death. 
We would like to know, therefore, the Utah law on 
the order of succession and the amount of successional 
rights, particularly whether Utah law recognizes community 
of property between spouses and whether the surviving 
spouse and the children are considered compulsory heirs 
and if so, the amount of their respective successional 
rights or what is known in civil law as compulsory 
legitimes. [DX-253; (Emphasis added). (A copy of this 
Exhibit is included in the Addendum to the Brief)]. 
In response to this question from Mr. Angara, Mr. Salisbury said: 
It would therefore be my opinion that the Philippine 
Will should be governed by Philippine law even though 
inconsistent with the laws of the State of Utah because 
of the conflict of law rule referred to above. Prior 
to the above referred code section, Utah would have adopted 
the common law rule that the law of the domicile controls 
the validity of the Will and successional rights. 
(II) With respect to the legal effect of the 
trust agreement, both U.S. and Utah law would be the 
same as the Philippine law and include the assets of the 
trust in the estate for death tax purposes. However, as 
indicated above, under Utah law the assets of the trust 
would not be subject to collation in determining the 
compulsory share of the heirs. (DX-254). [A copy of this 
Exhibit is included in the Addendum to the Brief]. 
[Mr. Salisbury had a memorandum of law prepared by a lawyer in 
his office named William A. Meaders addressing some of the complex 
questions of which law would govern the various assets. (DX-249; 
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David Salisbury, TRB 84-98). Subsequently, after receiving the 
cablegram from Mr* Angara, an additional memorandum was prepared 
by William A. Meaders. (DX-255; David Salisbury, TRB 109-10). The 
memorandum stated, in part: 
It was our general conclusion that if Mr. Grimm 
is determined to have been domiciled in the Philippines 
at the date of his death, the Utah Probate Court will 
apply the Philippine laws of descent and distribution 
to all of his personal property. Utah laws of descent 
and distribution will probably be applied to any real 
property located in Utah.] 
Mr. Benavince, an after the fact witness, was called as an 
expert to testify as to the applicability of the Philippine law in 
regards to this case. [Emilio Benavince, TRB 321-403]. Mr. Benavince 
testified that pursuant to Article 16 of the Philippine Code that the 
law of the country in which the decedent is a citizen is the applicable 
law. [Id. at TRB 347-361]. However, MAXINE, having the benefit of 
Mr. Angara's and Mr. Salisbury's opinion did execute the family 
settlement agreement. [PX 58; Maxine Grimm, TRA 253, 299; Pete Grimm, 
TRA 527; David Salisbury, TRB 123, 243-44]. 
At the time of GRIMM'S death, his estate, mostly personal pro-
perty, was in excess of Eight Million Dollars, with assets situated 
in the Philippines, in Hong Kong, and in the United States. (Merle 
Norman, TRB 737; Maxine Grimm, TRA 21; Pete Grimm, TRB 439-441]. 
There were numerous questions to be resolved. [Donald Holbrook, TRB 
871-72; David Salisbury, TRB 107]. Mr. Salisbury also corresponded 
with an attorney in Reno, Nevada, concerning the validity of GRIMM'S 
divorce and hence the validity of his marriage to MAXINE. (DX-250; 
Maxine Grimm, TRA 102; David Salisbury, TRB 283-86]. 
A Settlement Draws Near - Feb. 1978 - March 1978 
35. By February, 19 78, Mr. Salisbury had concluded that it 
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might be an advantage to work out a settlement for tax purposes if 
the trust could be left intact. (PX-254). [DX-254 is a cablegram 
sent to Edgardo Angara dated February 21, 1978, and February 24, 1978. 
The February 21 cablegram extensively discusses various tax and estate 
problems raised by both attorneys. Mr. Salisbury concluded that it 
would be virtually impossible to establish a domicile other than the 
Philippines and that the Philippine Will would be goverened by 
Philippine law even though it was inconsistent with the laws of Utah 
because of the conflict of law rules. He ended by stating: 
There may be some merit after considering all of the 
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs. Grimm 
to try to work out some settlement with the two daughters 
by the prior marriage as to the percentage of the Philip-
pine estate in which they will be entitled to participate, 
particularly if the assets in the trust could be left intact. 
(DX-254, p. 6)]. 
[In February of 1978 Maxine invited Rex and Ethel to dinner after 
returning to the Philippines. She stated she could not carry hate or 
vengeance and prayed for peace of mind and decided she would try to 
invite them over to resolve any hard feelings caused by their removal 
of her possessions and Ethel's appointment as temporary administratrix. 
At dinner they discussed no business relating to the estate but only 
pleasant social matters. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 268-270)]. 
36. During March 1978, Mr. Salisbury talked at least five times 
with MAXINE about legal issues concerning this estate and the 
possibility of settlement. [David Salisbury, TRB 123, 229; Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 289-290]. Mr. Salisbury made calculations as to what 
ETHEL and NITA might receive under various assumptions. [David 
Salisbury, TRB 115]. MAXINE told Mr. Salisbury that ETHEL had pre-
sented a paper outlining a settlement proposal and had asked her to 
sign it. [David Salisbury, TRB 113]. Mr. Salisbury advised MAXINE 
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not to sign and, upon his advice, she did not do so. [David 
Salisbury, TRB 114]. 
[The "paper" referred to in paragraph 36 of the Findings was a 
typed proposal prepared by Ethel Roberts (PX-92; Rex Roberts, TRB 653]. 
The proposal came about from numerous discussions among Pete, Maxine, 
Ethel, and Rex. (Rex Roberts, TRB 642). At the time Pete Grimm had 
completed one and a half years of an MBA degree and basically nego-
tiated on behalf of himself, his mother and sister Linda. (Pete Grimm, 
TRB 607-08). Maxine expressed her desire to maintain family harmony 
and to avoid unpleasantries between the two factions of the family. 
(Rex Roberts, TRB 946). "Ethel's Proposal" (PX-92) developed over a 
period of weeks and initially contained nine points. (Rex Roberts, 
TRB 6 54) . Six of these points were later incorporated into the com-
pleted family agreement prepared by the lawyers. (Id. TRB 658). 
It was decided jointly that Maxine Grimm, Linda Grimm, and Pete Grimm 
collectively would receive 75% of the estate with Juanita and Ethel 
to receive 25%. (Pete Grimm, TRB 478-480) . In order to assure 
Maxine a minimum inheritance, it was agreed that in any case she 
would receive $1 million plus the Philippine home and the Utah home. 
This condition was not listed in Exhibit 92. (Rex Roberts, TRB 953)]. 
[Appellants in their Brief attempt to depict Maxine and Pete as 
victims of a vicious and brutal attack by Ethel and Rex. (Appellants1 
Brief, pp. 29-26) . There is no doubt that various claims were being 
asserted by the Robertses concerning the validity of Maxine's marriage, 
questions regarding taxation, and other matters concerning the estate. 
While Appellants attempt to show that these claims were all without 
merit, further review of the facts (as will be developed) show that 
there were substantial problems involving this complicated estate and 
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that all parties concluded it was in their best interest to unite 
for tax purposes and to provide a united front against Mr. Grimm's 
former partner, Mr. Parsons. Appellants have carefully selected 
only evidence given by their witnesses and have ignored all evidence 
to the contrary which shows this mutual negotiated agreement.] 
37. MAXINE was agreeable to and desirous of entering into an 
agreement, but wanted it consummated in Utah under Mr. Salisbury's 
supervision and wanted to receive her one-half free of tax. [Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 137-142, 272; David Salisbury, TRB 114]. 
38. On March 7, 19 78, MAXINE wrote Mr. Salisbury indicating 
her desire and need for a settlement. She said: 
I am wondering if our communication is getting 
through. We understood that you were going to let us 
know if you needed the will. We could have sent it 
earlier if we had known. As you know, time is a factor 
with us. We cannot do anything until we get that court 
order out of our hair. I have talked to Ethel and she 
well understands that if we fight we can all lose, so 
she is agreeing not to fight, but I still know that 
there is great feeling there and she could turn under 
pressure, although I think she would be" afraid to. T 
have no feeling of pressure anymore. I can talk without 
any emotional feelings, so I am grateful for that blessing. 
Peter, of course, has no problem. I feel good about the way 
he is talkingT As soon as our position is straightened out, 
we can begin to act, and then I think we will get more 
cooperation. At this time everyone is afraid to do or say 
anything, as they know what a horrible thing it would be 
if the family fought in court—everything then would get 
exposed—good and bad. 
I feel that these lawyers are a bit puffed up with 
their name and need direction and push,, They are more 
apt to follow than lead. 
Mail is very slow. We are getting ours in 2 weeks. 
You will probably get ours in 4 to 7 days. Clark Air 
Base gets theirs in 4 days, but it is a long ride up 
there to get it, however, with important papers that 
is the best way I think. Sending them by courier is 
expensive--$30 plus, but we felt this was the only way 
to send the will, as we know of no one going to the States. 
Thank you so much for your interest and help. Some-
how all of this will come out alright. Are you aware that 
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Rand is coming in April? (DX-256). [Emphasis added. 
Copy of Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the Brief. 
Maxine Grimm, TRA 274-78]. 
The Lawyers Begin Their Task - March 1978 - April 1978 
39. In late February or early March 1978, ETHEL and NITA 
employed Mr. Donald Holbrook of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
to represent their interests in Utah. [Donald Holbrook, TRB 868-74; 
David Salisbury, TRB 116]. Mr. Holbrook and others in his office 
and Mr. Salisbury and others in his office communicated over a 
period of several weeks. [David Salisbury, TRB 115-117; Donald 
Holbrook, TRB 874-75, 897, 917]. [Pete Grimm, on March 29, 1978, 
sent Mr. Salisbury a letter and a chart asking Mr. Salisbury to 
examine it in relation to the inheritance taxes and to Ethel's pro-
posal. (DX-259). A copy of this Exhibit is attached herein to the 
Addendum]. On April 4, 1978, Mr. Holbrookfs office and Mr. Salisbury's 
office stipulated to the admission of the non-Philippine will to 
probate in Tooele County under certain conditions. (DX-260). [David 
Salisbury, TRB 120-21; Donald Holbrook, TRB 882-82]. [Mr. Salisbury 
did not agree to the probate proceeding until he had talked to Mrs. 
Grimm the previous day. (David Salisbury, TRB 123; Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 289-290). Mr. Holbrook sent a letter to Rex Roberts on April 6, 
1978 outlining the possible claims they could assert. (DX-308). 
(A copy of this Exhibit is attached herein to the Addendum)]. Final 
negotiations, with REX representing ETHEL and NITA, and PETE repre-
senting MAXINE and LINDA consumed at least five days, from April 20 
through April 25, 197 8. [Pete Grimm, TRB 551-57; Rex Roberts, TRB 
966-68; David Salisbury, TRB 133-34]. There were at least four 
revisions of the first draft prepared by Mr. Salisbury. (DX-261, 
DX-261A, DX-263, DX-264, DX 265). [At least one of those revisions 
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was exchanged between the Salisbury law firn and the Holbrook law 
firm. (DX-264; David Salisbury, TRB 139)]. The final agreement 
was incorporated into two documents, the Settlement Agreement and 
the Supplemental Memorandum. (PX-57, 58, 59). [David Salisbury, 
TRB 148]. 
40. During the negotiations each side presented points and pro-
posals to advance the positions of their clients. [David Salisbury, 
TRB 133-38; Donald Holbrook, TRB 887-89, 910]. [Mr. Salisbury 
testified as to his recollection of his meeting with Donald Holbrook. 
He stated that Holbrook indicated the claims that would be made if 
the matter had to go to litigation. Holbrook said he would question 
the validity of the divorce of the decedent from the first Mrs. Grimm 
and the validity of the marriage to Maxine Grimm. He also said he 
would make whatever claims he could under Philippine law and would 
challenge the validity of the trust that had been created in Utah 
and the circumstances surrounding its creation. (David Salisbury, TRB 
118)]. PETE and Mr. Salisbury were insistent and [sic] the first 
wife, JUANITA, sign the agreement to relinquish any claims she might 
have to the estate. [-David Salibury, TRB 136; Pete Grimm, TRB 555]. 
During the negotiations it was agreed that MAXINE receive a guaranteed 
minimum of $1,500,000 plus her two houses and certain bank accounts 
regardless of the eventual size of the estate. [David Salisbury, 
TRB 143-44] . PETE and Mr. Salisbury also insisted that MAXINE 
receive her share without reduction by way of death taxes. [David 
Salisbury, TRB 141; Pete Grimm, TRB 591A; Rex Roberts, TRB 969; 
Donald Holbrook, TRB 890]. Negotiations also resulted in an agreement 
that PETE and LINDA receive certain bank accounts and that ETHEL and 
NITA be guaranteed a minimum. [Pete Grimm, TRB 554; Rex Roberts, 
TRB 969]. 
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[Rex Roberts testified that the increase of Maxine's guaranteed 
minimum from $1 million to $1.5 million, the addition of land 
surrounding the houses, allowing Maxine to receive her share before 
taxes were paid, and the allocation of the separate bank accounts were 
all different from that which was agreed during the discussions 
among the heirs in the Philippines. (Rex Roberts, TRB 969). A 
comparison of Exhibit PX-190 (Ethel's proposal), which was prepared 
in the Philippines with the actual Family Settlement Agreement, 
disputes the statement made in Appellants1 Brief that the "lawyers 
only played a peripheral role in the settlement negotiation." (Appel-
lants1 Brief, p. 24)]. 
41. Mr. Salisbury communicated at least twice in April with 
MAXINE. [David Salisbury, TRB 122]. [Maxine and Pete both wanted 
to have family harmony and to avoid expensive litigation. (David 
Salisbury, TRB 298-99)]. PETE conferred with Mr. Salisbury on a 
continual basis between April 17 and April 25, 1978. [David Salisbury, 
TRB 133; Pete Grimm, TRB 551-57]. On the morning prior to signing 
the Family Settlement Agreement PETE represented to Mr. Salisbury 
that he had discussed the agreement with his mother (MAXINE) the night 
before and that she wanted to go ahead. [David Salibury, TRB 146]. 
The Agreement Takes Effect - April 1978 - Jan. 1979 
42. The Agreement was signed on April 25, 1978, by PETE and 
LINDA, by PETE as attorney-in-fact for MAXINE and by REX as attorney-
in-fact for ETHEL and NITA. [PX-57, PX-97; Pete Grimm, TRB 487; 
Maxine Grimm, TRA 155-56; Linda Grimm, TRB 435]. It was also signed 
by both attorneys. [PX-57; Rex Roberts, TRB 970]. Subsequently a 
copy was signed by NITA in California and by ETHEL and MAXINE in 
the Philippine Islands. [PX-58; Juanita Grimm Morris, TRB 1099; Maxine 
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Grimm, TRA 151; Rex Roberts, TRB 972]. [Rex Roberts testified that 
when he took the copy of the Family Settlement Agreement to Maxine 
in the Philippines she was in a happy mood and told him that it was 
the right thing to do for the entire family. (Rex Roberts, TRB 
972-75)]. Pursuant to the Family Settlement Agreement, Mr. Salisbury 
was retained as attorney for the Estate to representa 11 of the 
"heirs". [David Salisbury, TRB 248]. 
43. The Family Settlement Agreement was not signed as a result 
of threats, duress or coercion. MAXINE was represented by Mr. Salis-
bury who advised Mrs. Maxine Grimm that he had investigated the claims 
made by NITA and ETHEL and she did not have to enter into a settlement 
agreement if she did not desire to do so. [David Salisbury, TRB 310-
314]. [Previously, Salisbury had discussed the settlement agreement 
with Maxine and said she should not sign it if she felt pressured or 
did not have the opportunity to review and reflect upon what she was 
doing. He also told her that in his opinion the 25% figure given 
to Nita and Ethel was too generous. (David Salisbury, TRB 248, 314). 
Mrs. Grimm acknowledged this advice, but said she felt it was necessary 
to enter into the agreement to end the pressure and disagreement that 
had occurred between the family members. (David Salisbury, TRB 243)]. 
[Appellants in their Brief state that "Rex acknowledged that 
without Maxine, Pete would not have agreed to the FSA." (Appellants1 
Brief, p. 27). This statement incorrectly characterizes Mr. Roberts1 
testimony. He stated that he did not believe that Pete would have 
agreed to the entire nine points contained in the FSA, but stead-
fastly maintained that he would have agreed to some form of settlement 
regardless of Maxine's interest. (Rex Roberts, TRB 1014-16)]. 
44. The Family Settlement Agreement was incorporated into two 
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separate documents to preserve maximum flexibility for filing of 
state tax returns. [David Salisbury, TRB 148-49, 154; Rex Roberts, 
TRB 970]. 
45. During the negotiations and afterward, there was a dis-
cussion about the desirability of presenting the Family Settlement 
Agreement to the court for approval. [David Salisbury, TRB 150]. 
Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was not unusual not to file the 
Family Settlement Agreement. [Id. at 151]. Mr. Salisbury also stated 
that the tax consequences were a consideration for not filing the 
Family Settlement Agreement with the court for approval. [Id.]. 
46. Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was not in the interest of 
the estate to make the agreement a matter of public record at that 
time. It was preferable to preserve maximum flexibility for the Estate 
and all signatories to the Agreement. [David Salisbury, TRB 149-51]. 
47. Subsequent to the signing of the Settlement Agreement all 
of the parties worked toward and pursuant to the Agreement. [DX-229, 
DX-240, DX-242; Pete Grimm, TRB 560-68]. 
48. On May 4, 1978, MAXINE and ETHEL jointly retained the 
accounting firm of Price-Waterhouse to be Estate Accountant. (DX-213). 
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 297-99]. 
49. On May 19, 1978, MAXINE, PETE and ETHEL filed a Joint 
Petition for Letters of Administration in accordance with the terms 
of the Agreement (DX-214) [Maxine Grimm, TRA 172] which Petition was 
granted and Joint Letters issued on July 2, 1978. (DX 218). [Maxine 
received many benefits from the Settlement Agreement and, conversely, 
Ethel and Nita changed positions in reliance upon the Settlement 
Agreement. If the Settlement Agreement were allowed to be repudiated 
the parties as a practical matter could not be returned to status quo. 
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For instance, the major assets of the estate, namely, Globe Invest-
ment Company, and receivables from the Everett Steamship Company 
were excluded from the Philippine Estate (DX 239). If no Settlement 
Agreement had been entered into, of course, Ethel and Nita would have 
sought that the gross Philippine estate of E. M. Grimm would include 
all property, real or personal, wherever situated (DX 253)J. 
50. On June 27, 1978, MAXINE wrote NITA a letter expressing 
her pleasure with the Agreement and that "much money will be saved" 
because of it. (DX-292). [Maxine Grimm, TRA 301-02]. [This letter 
refutes the claim by Appellants in their Brief that Maxine was a 
beaten woman with no spirit at the time the Settlement Agreement was 
entered into. In one paragraph Maxine told Nita: 
I hope you will be pleased with the way we are 
running everything. It is so complicated that we 
have to tread lightly with everything we do. We are 
trying to avoid bankruptcy with the pigs—trying to 
make the most out of everything and I really feel 
that we are making headway. It has taken some time 
to get people to help, but I think now everyone knows 
that we are not going to fight in the iamily and are 
now willing to help all they can. This is going to 
make a tremendous difference and much money will be 
saved as a result of it. We have stil] not submitted 
any inventory to the court—that is, not since Ethel 
did, so we have no details to report, but by the time 
Ethel comes she will be able to explain everything to 
you. I just wanted you to know that we have not been 
idle and in this case doing things cautiously and slowly 
I think is best. (DX-213)• (A copy of this Exhibit is 
attached in the Addendum to the Brief)]. 
[In May of 1978 a conference was held with various tax accoun-
tants, lawyers, and Pete Grimm. As a result of that conference a 
letter was prepared on July 10, 1978 by Peat, Marwick & Mitchell, 
CPAs to David Salisbury, listing various alternatives as to how the 
Everett Steamship installment sale should be treated in the estate. 
(DX-268). The conference as well as the accounting letter made 
assumptions as to how the installment contract should be treated 
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based upon the provisions of the FSA. (David Salisbury, TRA 156-62)]. 
51. In August of 1978, MAXINE borrowed $500,000 from Globe 
Investment Company, an asset of the estate, and before liquid funds 
became available, Globe was required to borrow money at 9.65%. 
(DX-293, DX-371). [Maxine Grimm, TRA 306; Earl Tate, TRB 670]. 
52. On September 20, 1978, Mr. Salisbury wrote to the bene-
ficiaries again reaffirming the Agreement (DX 221). [Maxine Grimm, 
TRB 313]. This letter is the first of a number of reports to the 
beneficiaries by Mr. Salisbury concerning the progress of the Estate 
pursuant to the Family Settlement Agreement. [DX-229, DX-240, DX-242; 
David Salisbury, TRB 175; Maxine Grimm, TRA 313, 339, 373, 385]. At 
no time did MAXINE, PETE or LINDA take exception to any of the reports 
of Mr. Salisbury. [David Salisbury, TRB 170r 175, 258, 262; Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 323, 392]. 
[Another example of the disparity between the plaintiffs1 version 
of facts and the defendants' version is illustrated by Appellants' 
statement "The Roberts1 accusations and attacks became so intense 
in November of 1978 that Maxine finally got up and walked out." 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 29). Ethel Roberts, on the other hand, stated 
that during a meeting with Maxine, Pete, Ethel, and Rex, plus an 
attorney named Tabo, Maxine became very upset when she was asked a 
question about the accounting of the estate. (Ethel Roberts, TRB 
1057-59). The next day Ethel wrote a letter to Maxine expressing 
Ethelfs concern regarding Maxine's behavior. The letter states in part: 
I was dismayed when you walked out on us during 
the meeting yesterday morning. I can't understand 
what you are trying to accomplish and whether you are 
truly sincere or not when you say you are completing 
the accounting and will have it finished by the time 
Salisbury gets here. And I can't understand why any 
mention of an accounting should upset you so much and 
why you should take it so personally when you are in 
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fact dealing solely with estate funds. 
As you and Pete are the only ones with access to 
estate funds it is no more than natural that Nita and I 
would want to know what is being disbursed and for what . . . 
Pete told us you have not been feeling well and I hope 
you are better today. Is there anything I can do? Perhaps 
you and Pete are trying to do too much yourselves when you 
should be having much more professional help. 
Sincerely, 
Ethel 
[PX-110. A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to 
the Brief]. 
The Agreement Continues to be Enforced 
Feb. 1979 - Oct. 1979 
53. In February, 1979, MAXINE obtained an Order for a family 
allowance of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of GRIMM'S 
death. [DX-230; Maxine Grimm, TRA 334-35, 430]. 
54. Also in February, 19 79, the U.S. Estate Tax Return was 
signed by MAXINE and filed. [DX-272; Maxine Grimm, TRA 338; David 
Salisbury, TRB 178]. The estate tax issue was simplified and aided 
by the Family Settlement Agreement in the opinion of Mr. Salisbury. 
[David Salisbury, TRB'307]. Under the return MAXINE claimed the 
maximum marital deduction. [DX-272; David Salisbury, TRB 307]. 
55. In November of 1978, Mr. Salisbury visited MAXINE in the 
Philippine Islands. [David Salisbury, TRB 172-73]. Again, there was 
no indication by MAXINE during that meeting that she wanted to repu-
diate the Settlement Agreement. [David Salisbury, TRB 174, 250-51; 
258; Pete Grimm, TRB 584-86]. 
56. On May 23, 1979, $800,000 of the Everett receivable was 
distributed in accordance with the Family Settlement Agreement and 
in percentages designated by the Family Settlement Agreement: 
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$400,000 to MAXINE and $100,000 each to the four children. [Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 358]. In addition pearls and silver were distributed in 
accordance to the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement. [Rex 
Roberts, TRB 936-37]. 
57. In September, 1979, the Philippine estate taxes were paid. 
[Maxine Grimm, TRA 203-05; David Salisbury, TRB 267]. [Appellants in 
their Brief insinuate a wrongful motive on the part of Defendants in 
urging that a "bribe" be paid to the Philippine authorities. (Appel-
lants1 Brief, pp. 29-30). They state, "Maxine was opposed to paying 
a bribe." The evidence showed that all parties were opposed to 
paying this additional sum of money but that the realities of the 
Philippines required it. Mr. Salisbury stated that upon advice of 
Philippine legal counsel it was recommended that the 500,000 pesos 
payment be made. Mr. Salisbury talked to Mr. Lingueco, to Mr. Del 
Collar--Maxine!s personal lawyer—and Mr. Simon concerning this payment. 
All of the attorneys indicated that this is the way it is done in the 
Philippines. (David Salisbury, TRB 300-02). Salisbury stated that 
whereas the term "bribe" may be used in the United States, it would 
not be used in the Philippines. He adamantly stated that had this 
been in the United States he would not have recommended it. (Id. 
368-69)]. Because there were not sufficientl liquid funds to pay all 
of the estate taxes due, the shortfall was paid by the respective 
beneficiaries in accordance with their shares under the Family 
Settlement Agreement. [Rex Roberts, TRB 996; Maxine Grimm, TRA 379]. 
[Ethel and Nita paid 25% of this amount froml their own funds. 
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 335)]. 
58. In August, 1979, Mr. Salisbury again visited MAXINE in 
the Philippine Islands and traveled with MAXINE to Hong Kong. 
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[David Salisbury, TRB 186-87]. 
59. In September, 1979, Mr. Salisbury, as part of his regular 
reports, provided for a plan of partition in accordance with the 
Family Settlement Agreement. [DX-241; DX 242; Maxine Grimm, TRA 
385-90] . Again, no obligation was made by MAXINE, PETE or LINDA. 
(DX-241). [David Salisbury, TRB 258-62]. 
[On September 29, 1979 Ethel wrote Maxine a letter. (DX-24). 
In the letter Ethel stated that she had been trying to reach Maxine 
for several days and could not do so. She stated she was concerned 
that a brokerage house in which some of the estate money was banked 
had closed. She then stated: 
I must insist that you furnish me immediately, today, 
a complete accounting of all the Philippine stock assets 
which have been in your care and custody since my father's 
death. The accounting should include all dividends, cash 
and stock. 
Also, I want to see the stock certificates that you 
are holding. 
And please as I have requested before, 1 must again 
ask you for the accounting files which I turned over to 
Pete and was assured would be returned to me on request. 
I have had your continual promise but no files. (DX-243). 
(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the 
Brief)]. 
60. On October 1, 19 79, MAXINE wrote ETHEL stating that soon 
the beneficiaries would have the actual partition. [DX-244; Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 401-03]. [The letter relates various figures about the 
estate and the taxes that had been paid. The letter then states, 
"As to the other things stated in your letter, we are still working 
on them. Since we shall soon have the actual partition, all those 
other matters mentioned by you shall be taken care of." (DX-244). 
(A copy of this Exhibit is attached to the Addendum to the Brief)]. 
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Maxine Refuses to Cooperate - Oct. 1979 - May 1980 
61. After October, 1979, MAXINE did nothing to cause the 
partition of the estate to occur. [Another glaring example of the 
diversion in testimony between Plaintiffs and Defendants and the 
Appellants' reliance solely upon their own version of the story con-
cerns the evidence surrounding the pig and pearl farms. Appellants 
in their Brief maintain that the pearl farm was a valued possession 
of the decedent, who wanted his daughter Linqla to have it, but that 
Rex Roberts bought it "but did not pay for it." (Appellants1 Brief, 
p. 29). This paragraph in Appellants1 Brief implies that Mr. Roberts 
took something away from Maxine, Pete, and Linda which they wanted to 
retain. The evidence is to the contrary. DX-306 is a letter dated 
January 18, 19 79, from Pete to Maxine. In the letter Pete tells his 
mother, "I am not sure that I want to manage a farm down there any-
way—so Ifm talking. I'm not sure I like his price though. Also— 
he needs something to keey busy—if he's not working on something he 
may get in the way." Pete Grimm stated in cross-examination that he 
was interested in selling the pearl farm because it was a long way 
from Manila and it had many problems associated with it. (Pete Grimm, 
TRB 577). Rex Roberts never admitted that he paid no money for the 
farm, but, on the contrary, explained in detail how the money was 
arrived at and how it was to be paid. (Rex Roberts, TRB 989-90)]. 
[Likewise, the story of the pig farm paints two completely 
different pictures. According to Appellants, Rex Roberts wanted the 
farm placed in bankruptcy so he could avoid paying the creditors but 
Maxine resisted, auctioned off the pig farm, and ultimately paid off 
everybody. (Appellants' Brief, p. 28-29). To the contrary, Mr. 
Roberts testified that the pig farm went into insolvency in November 
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of 1978, leaving many creditors. Maxine, according to Rex Roberts, 
only wanted to pay the creditors who were members of Mrs, Grimm's 
church. She did not want to pay the other creditors. Rex Roberts 
objected and said that everyone had to be paid equally. He eventually 
put the farm in involuntary bankruptcy, which he thought saved the 
estate approximately 7 million pesos, and held the farm past the 
point where general creditors could come in against the estate. (Rex 
Roberts, TRB 979-84)p. 
62. MAXINE did not file an inventory in the Utah Probate pro-
ceeding, and attempted to block any progress toward partition by 
failing to communicate with ETHEL and NITA. [PX-131, PX-137; Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 199-202]. 
[In December of 1979 Mr. Salisbury prepared a letter to be sent 
to Maxine. While he never sent it to Maxine, he showed it to Pete. 
He criticized Maxine for not contacting his firm or consulting with 
him as to the hiring of accountants and attorneys in connection with 
a number of important decisions and stated that this placed him in an 
untenable situation as to the other beneficiaries, who were given to 
believe that he would be coordinating the legal work involved in 
administering the estate. (PX-281). (A copy of this Exhibit is 
attached herein to the Addendum to the Brief). (David Salisbury, TRB 
199-202)]. 
63. On May 14, 1980, a petition for removal was filed on behalf 
of ETHEL and NITA requesting MAXINE to be removed as Personal Repre-
sentative and requesting distribution in accordance with the Family 
Settlement Agreement. [PR 81-84; Maxine Grimm, TRA 411]. 
The Agreement is Repudiated by Maxine - June 1980 
64. On June 13, 1980, Mr. Rand wrote Mr. Salisbury informing 
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Mr. Salisbury that MAXINE, PETE and LINDA were repudiating the 
Agreement. [DX-283; Maxine Grimm, TRA 209-10]. [Mr. Salisbury 
accordingly withdrew. (David Salisbury, TRB 204)]. 
[Maxine Grimm acknowledged that during the entire course of 
proceedings she had been represented by the following attorneys: 
Mr. McConkie, Mr. Salisbury, Mr. Rand, and Mr. Berman in the United 
States and Mr. Angara, Mr. Limqueco, Mr. Del Collar and Mr. Blanco in 
the Philippines. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 413)]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The terms of the Family Settlement Agreement were binding 
upon the plaintiffs in that court approval was not required in order 
to make a legally enforceable contract among the parties signing it. 
In addition, the conduct of the plaintiffs brings into play a number 
of equitable doctrines which would prevent them from being able to 
escape the obligations of the Family Settlement Agreement because of 
change of positions which have occurred since its execution. 
2. The lower court was correct in concluding that the alleged 
spendthrift trust did not effect the validity of the Family Settlement 
Agreement or the ability of the court to approve it. The inter vivos 
trust is merely illusionary and in any case contains few assets 
because of no proper delivery prior to the decedent's death. Plain-
tiffs have renounced any interest in the trust and are estopped from 
now claiming under it. Section 75-3-1101, in any event, makes a 
Family Settlement Agreement binding upon thq parties even if it 
affects a trust or inalienable interests. It was unquestionably in 
the best interests of all of the beneficiaries to enter into this 
Agreement and to terminate the trust. 
3. Proper notice was given to all necessary parties pursuant 
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to Section 75-3-1102 (c) and the claimed deficiency of Plaintiffs 
simply does not exist. 
4. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial on their defenses 
of duress and failure of consideration once the defendants elected not 
to proceed on their counterclaim. In addition, they were not entitled 
to a jury trial on their claim of intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress. First, under Philippine law their complaint failed 
to state a claim. Second, even if Utah law is applied the evidence is 
insufficient to state a claim. Third, the plaintiffs were not entitled 
as a matter of right to have a jury trial or this issue and the lower 
court, if it reached that point, properly found the evidence against 
the plaintiffs. Fourth, if Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury deter-
mination they waived this right by failing to make proper objection. 
5. The lower court correctly applied the evidence in this case 
to the correct standard in concluding that there was adequate consider-
ation exchanged between the parties creating a binding Family Settle-
ment Agreement. Although there are two standards in the country used 
for evaluating compromise and settlements, the "good faith" standard 
is by far the best over the "bona fide claim" standard. In any event, 
under either standard the evidence in this case shows that Defendants 
asserted both good faith and bona fide claims thereby providing suffi-
cient consideration for the Family Settlement Agreement. 
6. The Findings of the lower court comply with Rule 52 Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and provide an adequate basis for appellate review. 
The Findings contain factual support for any conclusionary statements. 
The failure of the court to include the evidence listed by Plaintiffs 
is simply explained by the fact that the court did not find in the 
plaintiffs1 favor and therefore rejected their evidence. 
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CROSS APPEAL 
The lower court erred in failing to award Defendants reasonable 
attorneys1 fees in their effort to enforce the Family Settlement 
Agreement. Since there was a specific contractual provision to this 
effect the lower court should have awarded fees to compensate the 
defendants for this expensive litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERMS OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
WERE BINDING UPON PLAINTIFFS. 
The plaintiffs attack the validity of the Family Settlement 
Agreement on the basis that they had supposedly repudiated the Agree-
ment prior to court approval. They argue that without such court 
approval the Agreement by them was revocable at any time and that 
"there is simply no way, given the language of the statute and the 
rule, that the Grimms should be held to have been bound to an FSA for 
seven years after its execution and four years after its repudiation. 
The testators1 intent is entitled to more refepect than that." (Appel-
lants1 Brief, p. 43). See Appellants1 Brief, pp. 39-43 as to these 
arguments. 
There are two responses to these contentions. First, under Utah 
law Plaintiffs were bound by the terms of the Agreement regardless of 
the fact that the court had not formally approved it. Second, even if 
Plaintiffs had the ability to repudiate prior to court approval, such 
ability was lost because of equitable considerations and Plaintiffs 
are now precluded from asserting any repudiation claim. These arguments 
will now be addressed. 
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A. The Family Settlement Agreement Was a Legal Contract 
and Did Not Require Court Approval to Bind the 
Signing Parties. 
The lower court entered the following Conclusions of Law: 
8. The Family Settlement Agreement was not subject to 
repudiation without legal consequences prior to approval by 
the court. Failure to obtain court approval does not 
invalidate the Family Settlement Agreement. The Family 
Settlement Agreement could be presented to the Court for 
approval at any time prior to distribution and closing 
of the estate. 
9. The Family Settlement Agreement is just and 
reasonable and should be approved and all fiduciaries 
under the supervision of this Court should be directed 
to administer and distribute the estate in accordance 
with the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
CR 1232-1231. 
The lower court thus (1) concluded the fact that the court had 
not formally approved the Family Settlement Agreement did not give the 
plaintiffs the right to repudiate the Agreement without impunity and 
(2) formally approved the Family Settlement Agreement pursuant to 
Section 75-3-1102, U.C.A. At this point in time the Family Settlement 
Agreement, therefore, has been judicially approved and the only questio 
remaining is whether the plaintiffs were able to repudiate it prior to 
such approval. 
Appellants argue that they had the right to repudiate the Agreemen 
at any time prior to this approval, and base such argument upon 
Section 75-3-1101 and 1102, U.C.A. In addition, they cite several 
cases from other jurisdictions dealing with repudiation of settlement 
agreements as well as this Court's case of In the Matter of the 
Estate of Frank Chasel, dealing with an attempt to repudiate a family 
settlement agreement. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 39-42). All of Appel-
lants' authorities are either distinguishable or are misplaced. A 
careful review of the statutory scheme in this type of case shows 
without doubt that Plaintiffs did not have the right to repudiate 
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without suffering severe legal consequences. 
This Court in Chasel observed the general rule that "compromise 
agreements in estate disputes, even more than in settlement of litiga-
tion generally, are encouraged to promote harmony and to prevent the 
waste of assets." 12 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Sept. 15, 1986). This 
statement is in accord with the general rule throughout the United 
States: 
In accord with the general policy of law which favors 
the compromise of controversy and the avoidance or termina-
tion of litigation, it is said that the law looks with favor 
upon agreement of compromise among members of a family which 
avoids a will contest or promotes the settlement and distri-
bution of the testator's estate, or, as it is sometimes stated, 
that such agreements are favorites of the law. 29 A.L.R.3d 
8, 25. 
Appellants in their Brief have ignored another section of the 
Probate Code which is critical to this type of agreement. Section 
75-3-912, U.C.A. states the following: 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities, 
competent successors may agree among themselves to alter the 
interest, shares or amounts to which they are entitled under 
the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in 
any way that they provide in the written contract executed 
by all who are affected by its provisions. . . . 
This section clearly allows all of the parties in this lawsuit 
who are now named as Plaintiffs and Defendants to contractually agree 
as to how the estate of Edward Grimm should be divided. The Family 
Settlement Agreement executed by all of these parties together with 
their attorneys certainly would be considered a "written contract" 
pursuant to Section 912. 
In Matter of Estate of Kruse, 710 P.2d 733 (N.M. 1985) the New 
Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the language of Section 912, which 
is modeled from the Uniform Probate Code. In that case, four heirs 
entered into an oral agreement as to the division of an estate. 
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Certain letters were exchanged between the heirs, including one 
written by the defendant acknowledging that an agreement had been 
made but repudiating the agreement. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
found that the controlling issue in the case was whether there was 
sufficient evidence of a written agreement to have been made before 
any repudiation occurred. In other words, if the contract was valid 
the subsequent repudiation was not significant. The case was remanded 
to the lower court to determine whether there was sufficient evidence 
to constitute a written agreement. Of course, here, there is no such 
problem. 
If Section 75-3-912, U.C.A. allows heirs to enter into written 
contracts concerning the distribution of assets of an estate, then 
what is the purpose of Section 75-3-1101 and 1102, relied upon by the 
Appellants in their Brief? The answer to this question can be found 
by examining an older Michigan case entitled In Re Peck's Estate, 34 
N.W.2d 533 (Mich. 1948). The law of Michigan has been utilized in 
the development of the Model Probate Code, which is the source of the 
present Utah Probate Code. See Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-1102, 
U.C.A. In the Peck case an agreement was entered into between the 
widow of the decedent and a bank which was cicting as a trustee for 
his estate. The settlement arrangement was never approved by the 
probate court. The agreement continued in effect from 1934 through 
1946. The heirs of the widow brought an action against the bank, 
claiming that the settlement agreement was invalid on the basis that 
it had not been approved by the probate court. In dealing with this 
contention the Supreme Court of Michigan stated: 
It was not necessary to secure the consent of the 
Probate Court to the settlement as there were no minors 
or unknown heirs involved. The court encourages settle-
ments where there is no fraud or mistake and the parties 
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are of age, particularly so where there is a full under-
standing of the provisions in the settlement and the 
parties are represented by able counsel. Id. at 538. 
The Court then noted a prior case argued by the heirs in which court 
approval was required. In stating that such approval was not required 
in this case the Court stated: 
[The existing Michigan law] does provide a method 
for securing approval of settlements by the probate court 
and the purpose of the act principally was to allow settle-
ments to be made with approval of the court so as to bind 
minors and unborn heirs and others whose present existence 
or whereabouts cannot be ascertained/ etc. It does not 
prevent settlement of controversies by parties legally 
competent to act in their own behalf. Id. at 538. 
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized the distinction between 
binding legally competent parties and binding parties of a limited 
capacity or unknown parties. 
The Court of Appeals of Missouri furthet clarified the reason 
for the creation of Sections 1101 and 1102. In Columbia Union National 
Bank v. Bundschu, 641 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. App. 1982) a family settlement 
agreement had been entered into between several groups of heirs. 
Missouri has also adopted the same provision of the Uniform Probate 
Code. The Court noted that heirs could always enter into a settlement 
agreement as to the disposition of assets even before the statutory 
probate code had been adopted. However, the court noted: 
The new law provides a more defined and competent pro-
cedure for that purpose and, as a matter of public policy, 
settles and binds not only the parties to the compromise 
agreement but also those in interest "uhborn, unascertained, 
or who could not be located" according to a prescribed method 
of representation and notice. Id. at 874, fn. 7. 
Thus, the purpose of 75-3-1101 and 1102 is not to create a 
legally binding contract upon the parties to a family settlement agree-
ment, since Section 75-3-912 has already performed this function. 
Rather, its purpose is to eliminate any claims by non-party heirs to 
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the family settlement agreement in order to place it at rest. It 
is essentially analogous to the purpose of recording statutes in 
real estate. As is true between the parties of a real estate trans-
action, a legal right exists. Gregerson v. Jensen, 659 P.2d 396 (Utah 
1983). As to third parties, however, whose rights are dependent upon 
knowledge of such transaction, the failure to record precludes extin-
guishment of their interest. See §57-1-6, U.C.A. 
Here, all of the parties were represented by competent counsel, 
and after extensive negotiations entered into the Family Settlement 
Agreement. The Agreement continued in effect for nearly two years, 
even using Plaintiffs1 view of the evidence, before any repudiation 
occurred. All of the necessary parties in this dispute were parties 
to that agreement. There is no one in the present controversy who 
can claim that the lack of court approval somehow impaired their 
interest in the estate. None of the types cf interests referred to 
in §1101 andll02 are present in the claims asserted by Plaintiffs, and 
therefore these statutes cannot be used by them as an excuse for 
breaching their contractual agreement. 
None of the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs is applicable to 
this type of situation. This is not a workmen's compensation case in 
which those specific statutes govern the rights and liabilities of 
employee and employers. Obviously, the Legislature may feel that an 
employee is at an unfair advantage in dealing with his employer in any 
claim and therefore may choose to protect that employee by requiring 
Commission approval of any agreement entered into with that employee. 
This same type of disparity in positions is not found in the present 
situation. In addition, the Safeway Stores, Inc. case and the Mackey 
case did not even have signed agreements at the time the settlement 
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was being sought. (Appellants1 Brief, p. 40). Likewise, in the 
Bece case only oral conversations between attorneys had occurred. 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 40). 
The Dacaney case (Appellants1 Brief, p. 40) is another example 
of specific legislation designed to protect a far different class of 
people. In Dacaney a statute of Guam required that before any settle-
ment could be reached regarding a minor, a court would have to approve 
the guardian's recommendation. Here again i$ a legislative prerogative 
to protect minors from unscrupulous guardian^ in entering into settle-
ment agreements. Similarly, in Georgevich (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 
40-41) the Federal Rules have required that d Federal District Court 
act as a representative of the members of a class whenever a class 
action has been approved by the court. Again, this statutory require-
ment is to protect absent members of the class from unfair settlements 
by parties to litigation. Here, no such protection is required. 
Finally, Appellants have on several occasions asked what would 
have occurred in the Chasel case of this Court had the will been found 
prior to court approval. It is Defendants1 contention that the result 
in Chasel would be exactly the same. In othfer words, had the son of 
Frank Chasel entered into a binding agreement with the other heirs for 
distributing the estate, that agreement woul<£l be binding regarding 
those heirs regardless of whether a will was subsequently found before 
formal approval of the settlement agreement ifiad been made. This con-
clusion is supported by the case of In Re Estate of Thompson, 601 P.2d 
1105 (Kan. 1979) . In that case an heir enteired into a family settle-
ment agreement because he was unable to findj a will of the decedent 
and was fearful that if the will were not found he would recover 
nothing under the law of intestate succession. Accordingly, he entered 
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into an agreement with the other heirs and on July 17, 19 75, he was 
appointed as Executor of the estate. The following day the original 
will was found and he immediately sought to vacate the settlement 
agreement. The court, in rejecting the heir's contention that the 
family settlement agreement should have been set aside, stated: 
The original of the will has since been found. The 
District Court concluded that the family settlement should 
be set aside on the basis of mutual mistake of fact. We 
disagree. In entering into the settlement the parties knew 
that the original will had not yet been found. They could 
not know what had happened to it; it might have been destroyed, 
by testator, or someone else, intentionally or unintentionally. 
It might still have existed, yet been permanently lost, or it 
might have still turned up. It was the intention of the 
parties to accept the consequences of the uncertainty. The 
possibility the original will might be found was a risk 
appellee accepted when he entered into the settlement. The 
fact that now, with full benefit of hindsight, he would not 
agree to the settlement is no basis for setting it aside. 
Id. at 1110. 
The cases cited by Appellants are not inconsistent with the statu-
tory scheme established by the Utah Legislature. It is clearly justi-
fied in some cases to require the court's approval of agreements before 
they can be officially binding upon the parties. In each instance the 
Legislature had elected to classify certain groups, such as minors, 
employees, class members, etc., as deserving of this protection. In 
the probate field this same reasoning applies as to all parties who 
are "unborn, unascertained or who could not be located." §75-3-1101, 
U.C.A. Until the court has approved the Family Settlement Agreement, 
any heirs who claim an interest in an estate but who are not parties 
to the agreement would not be bound by such agreement. On the other 
hand, the Legislature, by adopting the Model Probate Code and §75-3-912, 
has clearly approved the practice of allowing competent heirs to con-
tractually bind themselves as to the distribution of estate assets. 
It did not intend to allow these individuals to escape these contrac-
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tual obligations on the basis of two other sections of the code 
which were not directed to these individuals. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct in 
concluding that the failure to obtain court approval did not allow 
the plaintiffs an opportunity to repudiate the Family Settlement Agree-
ment with immunity and they were therefore bound by its written terms. 
B. Assuming Arguendo That Plaintiffs ^ere Entitled 
to Repudiate the Agreement Prior to Court Approval, 
The Plaintiffs are Nevertheless Equitably Foreclosed 
From Such Repudiation. 
The lower court entered the following Conclusions of Law relating 
to the conduct of the plaintiffs: 
5. Following the execution of the Family Settlement 
Agreement the parties acted in conformity therewith for 
a period of approximately twenty months during which time 
the plaintiffs received certain benefits and the defendants 
made changes in position to their detriment in reliance 
upon the provisions of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
6. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family 
Settlement Agreement aside at the time 0f its execution, 
which the court concludes they did not, such grounds were 
waived by the subsequent conduct of the plaintiffs. 
7. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family 
Settlement Agreement aside at the time d>f its execution, 
which the court concludes they did not, Plaintiffs have 
ratified and affirmed the Family Settlement Agreement. CR. 1232. 
As noted above, the lower court found that the plaintiffs were 
legally bound by the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement and that 
the failure of the court to approve it prior to the repudiation did 
not allow the plaintiffs an avenue of escape. Even if it is assumed 
that this conclusion is incorrect, the plaintiffs still should not be 
allowed to repudiate the terms of the Agreement. The facts in this 
case as found by the lower court and as supported by the evidence 
give rise to a number of equitable doctrines which prohibit Plaintiffs 
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from repudiating the Family Settlement Agreement. As stated by 
one authority: 
Even if a compromise and settlement is invalid or 
defective, a party seeking relief from it may not be 
entitled to a judicial remedy. Waiver, estoppel, 
ratification and adoption are among the grounds which 
may preclude a party from challenging validity of a 
compromise and settlement and from obtaining judicial 
relief. 15 A. Am. Jur.2d §44, p. 816. 
These equitable doctrines clearly are applicable to the facts 
of this case. The following events illustrate the reasons why equity 
cannot allow the repudiation of this Agreement. 
1. After the Family Settlement Agreement was 
signed, the plaintiffs and defendants jointly provided 
representatives to the intestate proceeding in the 
Philippines. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 261). They jointly 
hired accountants and lawyers for the Philippine estate. 
(Maxine Grimm, TRA 298). They jointly hired the Rand 
law firm ti litigate the U.S. tax case. (Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 319). 
2. All of the heirs agreed to the distribution of 
assets between the U.S. Tax Return (DX-2 72) and the 
Philippine Tax Return (DX-239). 
3. All of the heirs agreed that Maxine should be 
allowed to draw $3,000 per month as her widow's allow-
ance in the Tooele County probate proceeding. (DX 229). 
4. In May of 19 79 the Everett Steamship contract 
payment was distributed, with $400,000 going to Maxine 
and $100,000 going to each of the children. The next 
two years she retained the entire payment. (Maxine 
Grimm, TRA 358; TRB 765). 
5. In September of 19 79 all of the parties contributed 
to payment of the Philippine Estate Tax. (Maxine Grimm, 
TRA 371). Ethel and Rex Roberts paid out of their own 
personal funds 225,000 pesos or over $30,000 on behalf of 
the estate. 
6. Because of the agreement between the parties, 
Mr. Salisbury was able to utilize the maximum marital 
deduction and to allocate the various assets according 
to the best tax advantages. (David Salisbury, TRB 137, 
141). The Philippine estate specifically excluded the 
two major assets of the estate, Globe Investment Company 
and the Everett Steamship receivable, to the clear detri-
ment of Juanita Morris and Ethel Roberts. (DX-239). 
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7. With the use of the Family Settlement Agreement, 
the separate Supplemental Agreement, and the inter vivos 
trust the lawyers and accountants were able to use the 
highest flexibility in reporting the estate to the various 
jurisdictions. (David Salisbury, TRB 151; Pete Grimm, 
TRB 564). 
8. Maxine Grimm was able to borrow $500,000 from 
the Globe Investment Company at a favorable interest rate. 
(Lavar Tate, TRB 6 70-71) . 
The preceding events occurred because the disputes between family 
members had been settled by the Agreement. it is obvious that the 
estate and the plaintiffs received substantial benefits from these 
events which otherwise may not have been received had an ongoing 
dispute been in existence. There is no question, for example, that 
substantial savings in estate taxes were achieved by the placement 
of the major assets under the U.S. return and not under the Philippine 
return. (Compare DX-272, U.S. Tax Return wiij:h DX-239, Philippine Tax 
Report). While this was a clear benefit to estate and to the 
plaintiffs, it was a clear detriment to the defendants, since their 
strongest claim to any estate assets came und^r the terms of the 
Philippine will; and, by eliminating the majority of the assets from 
the Philippine jurisdiction, the defendants tthereby were substantially 
prejudiced in any claim they could assert. 
The defendants1 payment of approximately $30,000 for the Philip-
pine estate taxes was also a detriment to their position if Plaintiffs1 
claim that the Agreement was not binding is sustained. In addition, 
the heirs provided a united front in their negotiation with the 
Parsons family, which maintained a 50 percent interest in many of 
the jointly-owned companies. (Pete Grimm, TfcB 579). To the defendants, 
however, this seriously weakened their position, since they originally 
considered Parsons as a potential ally in any battle against the 
plaintiffs. 
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As will be discussed infra, the additional benefits to the estate 
during this period of time consisted of the original consideration for 
the Agreement, including family harmony, absence of litigation regard-
ing the validity of the inter vivos trust, litigation as to the 
domicile and distribution of assets of the decedent, litigation as 
to the validity of the marriage and divorce of the decedent, and 
questions concerning tax practices of the decedent, as well as several 
other claims. While the absence of litigation, for example, constitute 
the initial consideration for the Agreement, it continued on as a bene-
fit up until the time that the present dispute began some two and a 
half years later. 
The preceding conduct, resulting in various benefits and detri-
ments to the parties, justifies the imposition of several equitable 
doctrines. It can be said that the actions of the plaintiffs ratified 
any deficiency existing in the Agreement, since they obviously accepted 
the benefits of the contract after becoming aware of the claims they 
are now asserting. 15 A. C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement, §40, p. 264 
§42, p. 269. 
It is fundamental that any right to repudiate the contract can 
be waived by the parties. The plaintiffs can easily be said to have 
waived their right of repudiation by taking advantage of the two-year 
period for the benefit of the estate and thereby relinquishing any 
valid claim they would have had. See American Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968); Lichtensbein v. Lichtenstein, 
454 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1972); Prude v. Lewis, 430 P.2d 754 (N.M. 1968). 
Even more applicable is the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
This Court has defined equitable estoppel as involving an admission 
or statement or act inconsistent with a claim afterwards asserted; 
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where the other party acts on faith of such Admission, statement or 
act; and injury to the other party results from allowing the first 
party to repudiate such admission, statement or act. Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979); Blackhurst 
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). The Kansas 
Supreme Court in an earlier case applied the doctrine of estoppel to 
a family settlement agreement. The court th^re stated: 
It has been held that, where the widow and each 
of the children make a division of the estate satis-
factorily to themselves in which all parties concerned 
have acquiesced and retain the shares so alloted for 
a long period of years, they will be estopped from 
thereafter objecting to the arrangement] 
The parties to such an arrangementiwould be 
forever equitably estopped from disturbing it, as 
amongst themselves, upon the most familiar principles 
of justice. . . . Family arrangements ^re favorites 
of the law, and when fairly made are never allowed to 
be disturbed by the parties, or any oth^r for them. 
Riffe v. Walton, 182 Pac. 640, 642 (Kan. 1919). 
See also, Hughes v. Betenbough, 373 P.2d 318 (Kf.M. 1962). (Horton 
changed his position during his lifetime in Reliance upon the contract 
and the appellants should therefore now be eitopped to deny the 
validity of the agreement). 
These cases illustrate that courts of equity will utilize what-
ever means are necessary to prevent unjust enrichment by one party at 
the expense of another when the first party has performed in good 
faith the agreement. In Morris v. Leverett, 434 P.2d 912 (Okla. 1967) 
there was no written family settlement agreement introduced into evi-
dence. The court found, however, that the defendant had induced other 
relatives to forego a will contest by promising to divide the estate 
equally with them and refused to enter into a written agreement because 
of various excuses. After distribution of the estate to him he denied 
such agreement existed and attempted to rely upon lack of consideration 
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and the parole evidence rule. The court held that equity would not 
permit him to gain the advantage by such acts, but would treat the 
property which he acquired as being closed under a constructive trust 
for the benefit of the other parties. 
The present case is no different. Equity will not allow the 
plaintiffs to repudiate the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement 
after the defendants for over two years had relied upon it, had com-
promised their various legal positions and monetary positions because 
of it, and had made every effort to comply with its terms. Quite 
simply put, the plaintiffs cannot "have their cake and eat it too." 
Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to ally themselves with the defendants 
during the initial two years of probate and tax audits for the purpose 
of increasing the assets of the estate and then, after the rough 
waters have subsided, claim the benefit of all of the assets. "Equity 
will not allow a party to wait until another has improved property so 
that it becomes valuable before asserting an equitable claim." 
Williams v. International Assn. of Machinists, 4 84 F. Supp. 917, 920 
(D. Fla. 1978). 
Finally, a settlement agreement cannot be rescinded even for 
cases of fraud or misrepresentation when there is no possibility to 
put the parties in their original position. Id. at 920. As noted by 
another authority, "Where the parties cannot be placed in status quo, 
relief will ordinarily be denied, as where the rights of third persons 
have intervened." 15 A. C.J.S., Compromise and Settlement, §41, p. 
26 7. There is no conceivable way that the parties here could ever 
be restored to their pre-settlement positions. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE ALLEGED SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DID NOT 
AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT OR THE ABILITY OF THE COlllRT TO 
APPROVE IT. 
Appellants in their Brief maintain that the existence of the 
"Trust Agreement" created by the decedent prior to his death (PX-11) 
precludes the Family Settlement Agreement frdm affecting the assets 
and terms of that trust. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 43-47). Appellants 
cite several cases from other jurisdictions as well as the Sundquist 
case from this Court. The Appellants conclude that "the court should 
have rejected the FSA because it terminated and materially modified 
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust." (Appellants' Brief, p. 45). 
The authorities cited by Plaintiffs are in accordance with the 
general rule of law applying to trusts. Respondents do not dispute 
these cases or authorities. However, a review of these decisions and 
authorities show that they are inapplicable to the present situation 
for the following reasons: (1) the trust in this case is merely 
illusionary, and in any case, contains few assets; (s) plaintiffs have 
renounced any interest in the trust and are estopped from now utilizing 
it to avoid the FSA; (3) Section 75-3-1101, U.C.A. specifically allows 
family settlement agreements to be binding even if they affect a 
trust or inalienable interest; (f) regardless of the validity of the 
trust or the statutory probate scheme, it wa£ in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries to enter into the Family Settlement Agreement. 
These arguments will now be discussed ^n serium. 
A. The Inter Vivos Trust is Merely Illusory 
and in Any Case Contains Few Assets^. 
The trust executed in this case by the decedent is testamentary 
and illusory in character. It grants no present vested interest in 
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the beneficiaries at the time that it was signed and gives them a 
vested interest only upon the death of the decedent. In Alexander v. 
Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., 273 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954) this Court 
was presented with a similar purported inter vivos trust which stated 
that the interest of the beneficiaries did not vest until after the 
settlorfs death. This Court stated that "such declaration and intent 
makes the trust testamentary in character and thus inoperative. For 
us to otherwise hold would be to render impotent altogether the 
Statute of Wills." Id. at 174. 
Even if the trust is valid it contains few assets. The lower 
court made the following finding: 
It is questionable if the assignment (of various stocks) 
were in fact properly delivered to the trustee because Pete 
testified that he placed the assignments in his Dadfs safety 
deposit box which was in the name of E. M. Grimm. [Pete Grimm, 
TRB 541]. In October or November of 1977 but prior to Grimm's 
death, Maxine took the contents out of Grimm's safety deposit 
box and placed the contents in a safety deposit box in her 
name. [Maxine Grimm, TRA 223-225; Pete Grimm, TRB 542]. 
It was not until after the death of Grimm that she placed 
the trustee's name on the box. Pete wrote on November 14, 
1977, "Before transferring them (stocks) I think we should 
get their (Kirton, McConkie) opinion" (DX-302). [Pete Grimm, 
TRB 544-547]. (CR 1250, Finding No. 17). 
If the trust res is a stock certificate representing shares in a 
corporation, the method of transfer into a trust is to endorse the 
certificate to the trustee and deliver it to him. Delivery is an 
absolute essential element for the validity of the trust. Bogart 
on Trusts states the general rule: 
If the trust res is a stock certificate representing 
shares in a corporation, the normal method of transfer is 
to endorse the certificate to the trustee and deliver it 
to him. Section 32, at p. 107. 
Delivery is absolutely essential to the trust or the trust fails. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, §70A-8-30 9, endorsement of any stock certi-
ficate or purchase thereby is not enough. There must also be delivery. 
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The statute states: 
An endorsement of the security whether special or 
in blank does not constitute a transfer until delivery 
of the security on which it appears or, if the endorse-
ment is on a separate document, until delivery of both 
the document and the security. 
While new stock certificates were prepared by Globe Investment 
Company naming E. M. Grimm II as Trustee, the stock records themselves 
do not show or reveal that E. M. Grimm II actually took receipt and 
delivery of said stock certificates from the trustor. (PX-12). 
Finally, to create a valid "Spendthrift Trust" the beneficiary 
must only be able to receive the income—not the corpus. Rose v. 
Southern Michigan Bank, 238 N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931). Here Maxine could 
receive all of the assets if she needed them for her needs. 
For these reasons, therefore, there was no valid trust in exis-
tence at the time the Family Settlement Agreement was executed. 
B. Assuming Arguendo That There is a Valid Trust, 
Plaintiffs Have Nevertheless Renounced Any 
Interest in it and Are Estopped Frcpm Claiming 
Under It. 
Since the death of Edward Grimm, the plaintiffs have in no 
manner acted as though any assets of the estate were in trust property. 
Distributions have been made from the estate. The wills have been 
probated in Utah as though there were no trust agreement in existence 
and there is no evidence that the plaintiffs in this case ever accepted 
their interest in the trust assets. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, §75-2-801, beneficiaries to a purported 
trust can clearly renounce their interest even in cases where there is 
a spendthrift provision. The statute states, in part: 
(b) The right to renounce exists Notwithstanding 
any limitation on the interest of the person renouncing 
in the nature of a spendthrift provisiori or similar 
restriction. 
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(c) A renunciation or a written waiver of the 
right to renounce is binding upon the person renouncing 
or person waiving and all persons claiming through or 
under him. 
It has been to the advantage of the plaintiffs to treat the 
assets allegedly contained in the trust as if they were part of the 
estate for tax and other purposes. Equitable doctrines will not now 
allow them after this usage to come back and claim that the assets 
were all the time held in a trust made for their benefit. 
C. Assuming Arguendo That There is a Valid Trust With 
Assets, Section 75-3-1101, U.C.A. Makes a Compromise 
Family Settlement Agreement Binding Upon the Parties 
Even if it Affects a Trust or Inalienable Interest. 
Historically, courts have frequently given effect to agreements 
made for the purpose of resolving pending litigation but which have 
terminated spendthrift trusts. This has been true both in litigation 
involving the validity of the trust itself and in controversies 
involving other matters. See In Re Hansen, 533 A.2d 834 (N.J. Sup. 
1981); Third National Bank v. Schribner, 370 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1963) 
and In Re Duttonfs Estate, 79 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. 1956). Such actions 
have been approved even in the absence of any express statutory author-
ity empowering the court to terminate the spendthrift trust. 
In Utah, however, courts have been given specific statutory 
authority to validate and enforce settlement agreements which alter or 
entirely destroy spendthrift trusts. The provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §75-3-1101 have been referred to by one text author as a 
specific example of "legislation permitting a court to terminate a 
spendthrift trust. . . . " Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, §226, p. 490. 
The Utah statute specifically states, '"An approved compromise is 
binding even though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest." 
Clearly, whatever rules were previously applicable to the termination 
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of trusts involving spendthrift clauses have been altered by the 
enactment of this statutory authority. It should be observed that 
none of the cases relied upon by the appellants in their Brief concern 
interpretation of similar statutory language• 
For these reasons, the lower court was correct in rejecting 
the argument that the Family Settlement Agreement was somehow impaired 
by the existence of the Trust Agreement. 
D. Even if it is Assumed Arguendo That There is A 
Valid Trust, That the Trust Contains Assets, and 
That it Can Only be Terminated for the Best Interests 
of the Beneficiaries, Such Interest Exists in This 
Case. 
Appellants in their Brief have noted the position taken by the 
Restatement (2d) of Trusts concerning the termination of a trust 
agreement. Section 337 states: 
(1) Except as stated in subsectioi) (2) , if all 
of the beneficiaries of a trust consent and none or 
them is under an incapacity, they can compel the 
termination of the trust. 
(2) If the continuance of the trust is necessary 
to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the 
beneficiaries cannot compel its termination. 
The comment to this section states that before a trust can be terminated 
the court must approve any agreement and determine that it is in the 
best interests of the beneficiary. The comment then continues: 
The mere fact that the interests of the beneficiaries 
is not transferrable by him does not preclude the court 
from approving a compromise under which he surrenders a 
patt of his interest under the trust, since otherwise if 
a contest were successful his interest might be destroyed 
altogether. So also, the court can approve a compromise 
although the beneficiary is an infant or insane person 
or otherwise under an incapacity. Comment 0, p. 166. 
Defendants do not believe that the statutory scheme in Utah 
requires that termination be conditioned upon a showing of the "best 
interests of the beneficiaries." But even if it did such would be 
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the case here. Appellants, of course, contend that it was not in 
their best interest to terminate the trust since the defendants had 
no bona fide claim that jeopardized their interest and essentially 
only derived the benefit through means of blackmail and duress. 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 46-47). This conclusion is refuted by the 
Findings of the lower court as well as the evidence which clearly shows 
that material disputes existed and that it was in the best interest of 
all the beneficiaries to resolve them without litigation. The dis-
cussion as to whether these claims were "bona fide11 or not will occur 
infra. 
In addition, there is nothing inconsistent with the terms of the 
Family Settlement Agreement and the terms of the trust established by 
Grimm. The Trust Agreement itself empowers Pete, as Trustee, to exer-
cise complete discretion in distributing the res of the trust to his 
mother Maxine as he feels advisable. Mrs. Grimm, as beneficiary, is 
free to make whatever agreement she chooses regarding the disposition 
of trust assets which the trustee transfers to her. See Smith v. Smith 
253 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 1977); Mirot v. Mirot, 6 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 1946); 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, §152, Comment J. Therefore, the Family 
Settlement Agreement can easily be interpreted as an agreement 
whereby the trustee vests the entirety of the trust estate in Maxine 
Grimm, who simultaneously agrees to a plan for distribution of the 
estate. 
Appellants1 contention that the Family Settlement Agreement is 
somehow radically inconsistent with Mr. Grimm's intent is incorrect. 
Unlike many trusts, the one in question in this action has no definite 
terms, such as for the life of the person to be supported, but allows 
the trustee to convey the entirety of the trust property anytime he 
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deems it advisable to do so. As such, Maxinefs position and ability 
to control the assets was extremely similar under both the trust and 
the Family Settlement Agreement. 
Certainly, any purpose in establishing the trust was for the 
protection of Maxine and to make sure that she was taken care of 
during her lifetime. The terms of the Family Settlement Agreement 
insuring that she receive the two properties plus a minimum of $1.5 
million certainly assures this purpose. 
For these reasons, therefore, the mere existence of the trust 
agreement does not affect the validity of the Family Settlement 
Agreement or the decision of the court to abide by it. 
POINT III 
PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO NECESSARY PARTIES 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 75-3-1102 (c) AND THEREFORE 
APPROVAL OF THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS 
PROPER. 
As noted by Appellants the lower court iround that all interested 
persons had received notice as required by Section 75-3-1102(c). 
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 47-48; CR 1233). Appellants complain, 
however, that this finding is in error since there is no evidence 
that either Charles Parsons or Byron S. Huie received notice. Because 
of this alleged failure this Court is asked to reverse the lower 
court's judgment approving the Family Settlement Agreement. (Appel-
lants1 Brief, p. 48). 
The argument raised by Appellants in Section C of their Brief 
is an excellent example of other arguments raised throughout their 
Brief. There is no doubt, for example, that notice is required under 
the statute to all "interested persons." Respondents certainly do 
not disagree with this requirment. However, as is the case throughout 
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their Brief, the facts developed in the litigation do not support 
the legal argument being made. The argument concerning notice is 
perhaps the easiest of all to refute to show that these cited legal 
principles or requirements either do not apply to the facts of this 
case or have been completely satisfied by the facts of this case. 
The entire argument advanced by Appellants assumes that Charles 
Parsons and Byron S. Huie "were appointed with Maxine as Co-Executors 
of the Philippine Will." To support this c]aim Appellants cite 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7 at page 5. This exhibit is the so-called 
"Philippine Will" and paragraph 11 appoints Charles Parsons, Byron 
Huie, and Maxine Grimm as Co-Executors of the will. When this cita-
tion is examined, however, in light of the other evidence in the case 
it becomes apparent that the alleged factual statement is incorrect. 
While it is true that Mr. Grimm requested in his will that these 
individuals be appointed as co-executors, such request did not in 
fact make them executors. 
The Philippine proceeding was handled as an intestate matter with 
Maxine, Pete and Ethel being appointed as joint administrators of the 
estate. (Maxine Grimm, TRA 261). The Philippine will was not admitted 
in that proceeding. Instead, the Philippine will as well as the U.S. 
will were both filed in Tooele County along with a codicil and by 
stipluation of all the parties Maxine Grimm and Lavar Tate were 
appointed as personal representatives for both wills. (PR 54-50; PR 
60-57; Lavar Tate, TRB 667). 
Thus, there is no need to address the question as to what would 
occur if executors were not properly notified as to the proceedings 
surrounding a family settlement agreement since in this case the 
facts show that both executors were parties to all proceedings. While 
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this alleged claimed error is extremely easy to refute since it is 
based upon the simple fact of appointment of executors other claims 
throughout the Brief are equally unsupported but cannot be so easily 
shown. It is for this reason that Respondents urge the court to care-
fully examine the facts of this case as viewed from the Respondents1 
position before deciding whether the legal principles proclaimed by 
the Appellants are applicable to the circumstances of this case. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY 
TRIAL ON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SEVERE 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, DURESS AND FAILURE OF 
CONSIDERATION. 
Appellants complain that they were deprived the right of a jury 
trial as to the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
based upon their 11th Cause of Action in the civil case (Appellants1 
Brief, pp. 48-52), and were entitled to a jury trial on their defense 
of duress and failure of consideration relating to the counterclaim 
filed by the respondents seeking damages for breach of contract. 
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 52-54). In order to simplify discussion of 
this issue the second contention of the appellants will be addressed 
first. 
On August 10, 198 3 Defendants filed a counterclaim contending 
that the Family Settlement Agreement was completely valid and 
enforceable and that the plaintiffs Maxine, Pete and Linda Grimm had 
violated the terms of the Agreement thereby giving rise to a breach 
of contract action. Defendants sought damages in the amount of $10 
million for such breach plus a reasonable attorneys1 fee. (PR 16 38-
1632). On July 29, 1985 the plaintiffs filed their Amended Reply to 
Counterclaim. (CR 948-942) . They essentially claimed as part of 
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their defenses that the Family Settlement Agreement (the document 
from which the claimed breaches occurred) had been entered as a 
result of duress and was without consideration. (CR 942) . 
At the conclusion of the trial the lower court found in favor 
of the defendants and against plaintiffs. It found that the Family 
Settlement Agreement was a valid document, could not be repudiated 
by the plaintiffs, and could be enforced according to its terms. 
If the Agreement had not been specifically enforceable, Defendants 
could have had the right to proceed upon their counterclaim asking 
for damages as a result of the breaches allegedly committed by the 
plaintiffs. Had Defendants so proceeded, then, of course, Plaintiffs 
would have been entitled to assert their legal defenses and the 
entire matter would have been heard before the impaneled jury. 
The lower court in the hearing prior to trial described how this 
procedure would work. The court stated: 
Therefore, I grant you the benefit of having a jury 
trial, but so that everybody understands, the Court will 
make the decision as to whether or not the Family Settle-
ment Agreement is valid or invalid, and then based upon 
that you may proceed on your countercl aim—you may not 
proceed, but at that time the plaintiffs here cannot say 
they did not have the right for the jury to hear all 
of the defenses with regard to coercion, duress and 
other defenses. That's the way the Court is going to 
handle this. (Tr. July 26, July 30, 1985 hearings, p. 23). 
Plaintiffs have taken the novel approach of arguing that they 
have been deprived of a jury trial because the defendants were not 
required to proceed on their breach of contract counterclaim. In 
other words, Plaintiffs are asserting that they had a legal right to 
a trial so that they could assert their affirmative defenses. Such 
an argument is contrary to both logic and civil procedure. 
This conclusion can best be seen by taking the following hypo-
thetical example. Assume that "X" sues "Y" for a breach of contract 
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alleging damages. "Y" answers by stating that the contract is 
invalid for a number of reasons. "x" decides to dismiss the lawsuit 
against "Y". "Y" has no right (nor would he have any desire) to 
require that the trial proceed so that he could assert his affir-
mative defenses. 
Plaintiffs in this case filed their initial Complaint on the 
basis that the contract was void because of the various reasons 
listed in the numerous causes of action including duress and failure 
of consideration. They sought rescission of the contract on this 
basis. Rescission is clearly an equitable remedy and the lower court 
found against them. They cannot now complain that because the defen-
dants elected not to proceed upon their breach of contract counter-
claim that they have somehow been deprived of a jury right to assert 
their affirmative defenses. 
The analysis concerning their claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional harm requires a different analysis. No reversible error 
occurred as to this issue because of the following: (1) under 
Philippine law there is no cause of action for intentional infliction 
of emotional harm and therefore the action was not properly before the 
court; (2) if a cause of action did exist under Utah law, the court 
determined as a matter of law that the evidence did not state a claim; 
(3) the plaintiffs were not entitled as a matter of right to have a 
jury decide this issue and the lower court found in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiffs on the merits; (4) in the alter-
native, if Plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination as to 
this issue, then they have waived it by failing to make proper objec-
tion. These matters will now be discussed. 
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A. Under Philippine Law There is No Cause of Action 
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm and 
Therefore the Action Was Not Properly Before the 
Court. 
Under Utah Choice of Law Rules governing causes of action 
sounding in tort, the law to be applied is the law of the state 
where the acts constituting the alleged tort occurred. Buhler v. 
Maddison, 175 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1947). In the instant case, the 
alleged tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress took 
place in the Philippines and therefore Philippine law must apply. 
The Philippines do not recognize a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress without attendant physical 
injury. Philippine Civil Code §2219 provides that moral damages may 
be recovered for torts causing physical injuries. Thus, emotional 
distress inflicted without attendant physical injury directly provable 
to the alleged wrongful acts cannot be claimed in the Philippines. 
See generally J. Sangco Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 513-528 
(1973). Plaintiffs failed to allege in their Complaint that the pur-
ported outrageous conduct of the defendants caused actual physical 
injury to the plaintiffs. (CR 72). In addition, there was no evidence 
introduced at trial establishing physical injury as a result of the 
alleged conduct of the defendants. For these reasons, therefore, 
under Philippine law the lower court was correct in concluding that 
no cause of action existed and in finding in favor of the defendants. 
B. If Utah Law is Applicable, The Court Determined as 
a Matter of Law That the Evidence Did Not State a 
Claim. 
At the conclusion of Defendants1 case Defendants1 counsel moved 
for a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Direct a Verdict as to Plain-
tiffs1 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (TRB 
1119). The Court stated during that same proceeding that it found 
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in favor of the defendants on all issues. (TRB 1121). While admit-
tedly there has been no specific finding entered by the lower court 
to this effect the intent of the lower court can be ascertained from 
the trial transcript and from the Judgment entered against the plaintiff 
This Court on a number of occasions has concluded, as a matter of 
law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has not 
been stated or proved. In Gygi v. Storch, 503 P.2d 449 (Utah 1972) 
this Court held that the conduct of a woman towards a man who ultimately 
killed himself did not give rise to a claim even though her conduct 
had caused him great mental anguish and he repeatedly threatened to 
kill himself. See also, Covert v. Kennecott Corp., 461 P.2d 466 (Utah 
1969) (Summary Judgment afffd.); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982) (Summary Judgment afffd.). 
In addition, the Federal District Court of Utah on two occasions 
applying Utah law has also found no cause of action existed as a matter 
of law. In Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 
791 (D. Utah 1984) the court dismissed a cause of action claiming that 
employees of the Mormon Church had suffered great humiliation because 
of inquiries and practices relating to the religious beliefs and 
actions of the employees. The court after reviewing this Courtfs 
decision of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) stated the 
following: 
Regardless of how the court feels about the appro-
priateness of the defendant's conduct and, even though 
the plaintiffs may have been embarrassed, distressed and 
humiliated, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that 
the defendant's conduct does not rise to the level of 
"outrageous and intolerable conduct" contemplated by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Id. at 8 31. 
In Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982) the court 
found that the conduct of the defendants was privileged at the time 
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that the occurrences complained about by the plaintiffs occurred. 
This privilege nullified any outrageous or extreme conduct committed 
by the defendants. 
The Restatement of Torts 2d §46 is the foundation for this cause 
of action in Utah. Comment j discusses the type of severe distress 
which is required. It states: 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where 
the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where 
it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various 
names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or 
nervous shock or the like. It includes all highly unplea-
sant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, 
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappoint-
ment, worry, and nausea. It is only when it is extreme that 
the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is 
seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of 
transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of 
the price of living among people. The law intervenes 
only when the distress inflicted is so severe that no 
reasonable man would be expected to endure it. (Emphasis 
added). 
Comment h to the Restatement mandates that it is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct 
may reasonably be regarded as to extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery. Comment g states that "the actor is never liable, for 
example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal 
rights in a permissible way. Even though he is well aware that such 
insistence is certain to cause emotional distress." Courts in other 
jurisdictions have dismissed cases as a matter of law involving 
conduct similar to that alleged by the plaintiffs. 
In Hassing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983) the plaintiff 
and defendant were married for over thirty years. They obtained a 
divorce in 19 77 and for over three years the plaintiff claimed her 
husband continued to harrass her even after she had remarried. The 
lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff but the Supreme 
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Court of Nebraska reversed. The court held that although the harrass-
ment caused the plaintiff to be embarrassed and humiliated and had 
resulted in her crying, losing sleep, and consulting a psychiatrist, 
she had not shown that her distress was so severe that no reasonable 
person could have been expected to endure it 4 
In Whiehe v. Kukl, 592 P.2d 860 (Kan. 1979) the court held there 
as a matter of law that the conduct of the defendant on several 
occasions in verbal profane outbursts together with an assault by 
brandishing a pitchfork against the plaintiff was not the type of 
reckless conduct giving rise to a claim. 
Several courts have specifically held that efforts to enforce 
legal rights or to assert legal claims do not give rise, as a matter 
of law, to a cause of action. Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 455 F. 
Supp. 147 (D. Mo. 1978); Batchelor v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 547 F. 
Supp. 1480 (D. Mich. 1983); Nestlerode v. Federal Ins. Co., 414 
N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. 1979); Thompson v. Sikov, 490 A.2d 
472 (Pa. Super. 1985). 
Even taking the allegations most favorably to the plaintiffs as 
they have done in their Brief (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 50-51) there are 
still not sufficient facts to allow this cas^ to be submitted to a 
fact finder. While this no doubt involved a very emotional dispute 
between family members over a large sum of money a legal cause of 
action does not exist. Even under Plaintiffs1 version of the facts 
Defendants were always asserting a claimed legal and moral right to 
an inheritance and while such conduct no doubt caused grief among 
all of the parties the tort has not been created for the purpose of 
allowing family members to sue other family members as a result of 
family financial disputes. 
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For these reasons, therefore, the lower court was correct in 
concluding as a matter of law that no cause of action existed as to 
this claim. 
C. The Plaintiffs Were Not Entitled as a Matter of 
Right to Have a Jury Decide This Issue and the 
Lower Court Found in Favor of the Defendants and 
Against the Plaintiffs on the Merits. 
Plaintiffs maintained in the lower court that they were entitled 
to a jury determination as to their 11th Cause of Action for emotional 
distress. It should be observed that the entire nature of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint was one for repudiation or rescission of the Family Settle-
ment Agreement or, in the alternative, for damages resulting from it. 
Plaintiffs acknowledged that they could not plead both damages and 
rescission and that they would have to elect remedies at the time of 
trial. (CR 164-165). They obviously elected to seek repudiation and 
rescission of the Family Settlement Agreement rather than damages. 
Thus, the only claim which was unrelated to the validity of the 
Family Settlement Agreement was the 11th Cause of Action seeking damages 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
This cause of action was independent and separate from the 
entry of the Family Settlement Agreement. It could have been brought 
separately at any time with no equitable issues at all being involved. 
Instead, however, Plaintiffs chose to integrate this cause of action 
with their equitable claims and as such cannot now claim a right to 
a jury trial. This Court in Colman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 731 (Utah 
1981) held that where the issues presented are entirely or predominantl 
equitable in nature, a litigant is not entitled to a trial by a jury 
as a matter of right. See also, Bradshaw v., Kershaw, 529 P.2d 803 
(Utah 19 74). The International Harvester Credit case cited by 
Appellants in their Brief (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 48, 50, 53) is not 
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to the contrary. In that case this Court concluded that since 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint was seeking money damages it was clearly an 
action at law and was entitled to a jury trial. In dictum the Court 
observed that litigants had a right to a jur^ trial on legal claims 
raised in conjunction with equitable issues. This Court did not 
discuss the Colman case cited just months before nor did it discuss 
the situation here where a legal claim is completely separate and 
apart from the equitable claims being asserted. Defendants submit that 
the facts and circumstances of this case preclude the 11th Cause of 
Action from being a jury question. An annotation collecting cases 
throughout the country dealing with these types of circumstances states 
the following: 
In the absence of a statute or rule of procedure 
dictating a contrary holding, the great weight of authority 
has always been to the effect that the inter-position by 
the defendant in an equitable action of a counterclaim of 
a legal nature gives him no right to a jury trial, either 
of the case generally or of the issue raised by the counter-
claim. Having elected to assert in equity--as he was certainly 
not bound to do—a legal counterclaim, the defendant has been 
held to have elected to have submitted $11 of the issues raised 
in the action to trial in accord with the rules of equity 
procedure. 17 A.L.R.3d 1321, 1327. 
In Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 419 A.2d 167 (Pa. Super. 1980) a 
former wife initiated an action in equity against her former husband 
alleging that he had not complied with various terms of a property 
settlement, support and custody agreement. She sought equitable 
relief. The ex-husband filed a counterclaim alleging that the wife 
had not vacated the marital residence contrary to the terms of the 
agreement, asked enforcement of the agreement, and also sought damages. 
The court held that where a litigant chooses to initiate an action in 
equity he has assented to have all matters arising out of the occurrence 
or transaction decided by the equity court and therefore has waived 
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his right to jury trial with respect to the case in chief or any 
properly maintained counterclaim. Likewise a defendant who files a 
legal counterclaim to an equitable action, rather than asserting it 
as a separate action at law, has waived any right to have issues of 
fact thus raised tried by a jury. 
Thus, the emotional distress claim of Plaintiffs, assuming that 
it stated a valid cause of action, was not properly triable before a 
jury and the lower court was empowered to decide the case on its 
merits if it was not previously dismissed as a matter of law. Again, 
while the Findings do not specifically address the intentional inflic-
tion claim per se they do address the underlying facts. The court 
found, for example, that Maxine was not deprived of her free will durin 
the negotiation period, that the plaintiffs were not put in such fear 
as to overcome their free will or to compel them to act against their 
will, and that they did not use duress, coercion, or fraud against the 
plaintiffs. (Findings 65, 66 and 67). In addition, many of the 
factual findings state that the defendants were acting within their 
rights and were attempting to peaceably exist with the plaintiffs 
in spite of their differences as to their legal rights. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court did not err in 
failing to submit this matter to a jury and properly concluded that 
the evidence was in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs 
as to this claim. 
D
* In the Alternative, if Plaintiffs Were Entitled to 
a Jury Determination as to This Issue Then They 
Waived it by Failing to Make Proper Objection. 
Even if it is assumed for the purposes of argument that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination as to their 11th 
Cause of Action the record is clear that they waived any such right. 
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On August 16, 1985 at the conclusion of the trial motions were made 
by both sides in the chambers of the Court. At that time the Court 
announced that it was going to rule on behalf of the defendants as 
to all issues. It then asked the parties how they wanted to proceed 
as to the defendants' claim of attorneys1 fees. (TRB 1121). A 
discussion then occurred among counsel as to how the attorneys' fee 
question should be handled. (TRB 1122-24). The court then adjourned 
and reconvened in open court before the jury. At that time it ex-
plained its decision to the jury, thanked them for their services, 
and complimented the various sides. (TRB 1125-27). 
At no time during the in-chambers proceedings or in the open court 
proceedings did Plaintiffs' counsel object that the jury was entitled 
to decide the emotional distress issue. Had he done so the court could 
have addressed the question at that time wit& the jury still sitting. 
By raising it during this appeal Plaintiffs are now seeking a new trial 
which will necessarily require the recalling of numerous witnesses some 
of whom reside out of the country. 
A party must make an objection at the time of submission or 
lack of submission as to whether an issue legal or equitable and 
cannot wait until appeal to make such argument. First National Bank 
of Oregon v. Porter, 608 P.2d 598 (Ore. App. 1980). It is, of course, 
fundamental that appellate courts will not review a ground of 
objection not urged in the lower court and that counsel must give 
the trial court the opportunity to correct a claimed error before 
asking the appellate court to reverse a decision and require a new 
trial. Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620 
(Utah 1964). See also, Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1986); Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980). 
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Thus, the failure of the plaintiffs' counsel to timely object 
to the jury submission issue constitutes a waiver of that issue and 
cannot now be raised on appeal. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE EVIDENCE 
IN THIS CASE TO THE CORRECT STANDARD IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THERE WAS ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION EXCHANGED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEREBY CREATING A BINDING 
FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in both its legal 
standard of determining consideration for the Family Settlement Agree-
ment and as to its application of the facts to that standard. 
(Appellants1 Brief, pp. 54-64). The standard to be applied in 
determining consideration of family settlement agreements is one of 
first impression in Utah. Neither party has been able to find any 
Utah cases dealing with this subject. It is therefore critical to 
discuss the conflicting standards utilized throughout the country in 
order to allow this Court the opportunity to decide which standard 
it wishes to adopt. The cases and authorities cited by Appellants 
in their Brief take the hard-line approach that the compromise of a 
claim is only valid if the claim itself can be shown to be "bona fide" 
and have "merit" and it matters not the beliefs of the individual 
asserting the claim or the beliefs of the individual the claim is 
being asserted against. 
The second, and what Respondents believe to be the most rational 
approach is that a claim which is asserted in "good faith" by an heir 
constitutes sufficient consideration even if ultimately the claim is 
shown to have no merit and to be completely worthless. As will be 
discussed, courts consider this adequate consideration because the 
controversy itself is being settled regardless of the ultimate outcome 
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of the various claims. 
The evidence in this case supports eithfer standard. Defendants 
will show that these claims were asserted in "good faith" under the 
lesser standard of proof and will also show that the claims were 
"bona fide" using the higher standard. These standards and the 
evidence in this case will now be discussed. 
A. This Court Should Adopt the Standard That Adequate 
Consideration is Shown in a Family Settlement Agree-
ment if the Forebearing Party Has a Reasonable Belief 
That He Has a Ground For Opposing the Other Heirs and 
That He Forebears The Exercise of His Right Because 
of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
The lower court entered a number of Findings concerning the 
consideration question although not necessarily in chronological 
order. The Court stated: 
65B. Defendants in good faith believed that the 
claims they asserted regarding possible invalidity of 
the trust, possible invalidity of Grimmfs divorce and 
effect of application of Philippine law were legitimate 
claims. The claims were of such merit that Mr. Salisbury 
researched the issues and advised Maxine and Pete accordingly. 
65C. Defendants did not know that the claims they 
asserted were unfounded. It is not necessary to find 
whether they were or were not unfounded. 
69. With more specific reference to the claim of lack 
or failure of consideration the Court finds: 
A. Mutual forebearance to prosecute claims; 
B. Mutual promises for the sake of family 
harmony constitute consideration; 
C. Both sides of the controversy recieved 
benefits from the Family Settlement. Litigation 
was avoided (until repudiation) expense was minimized 
(until repudiation). The parties were united in 
dealing with taxing authorities and with the Parsons. 
Maxine received the residences. Maxine received a 
minimum guarantee. Maxine got her share free of tax. 
Philippine estate tax was reduced by making it unneces-
sary for Ethel and Nita to claim entire estate, except 
for real estate in Daggett County subject to distribution 
(and taxation) under law of the Philippines. 
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70D. The contest or controversy was and is in good 
faith and the effect of the agreement upon the interests 
of persons affected is just and reasonable. 
Conclusion No. 3: The Family Settlement Agreement 
is supported by good and sufficient consideration and is 
a valid and binding agreement. 
Conclusion No. 4: Following the execution of the 
Family Settlement Agreement there was no failure of 
consideration or breach of the Family Settlement Agree-
ment by Ethel or Nita or Juanita. (CR 1236-1233) . 
The lower court adopted the "good faith" position utilized by 
many courts and authorities throughout the United States. Appellants 
have relied upon a contrary line of cases utilizing the "bona fide" 
reasoning. It is unnecessary to explain it further since Appellants 
have adequately discussed it in their Brief. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 
54-58) . 
The general "good faith doctrine" applicable to any compromise 
agreement is stated as follows: 
If doubts expressed by the parties are based upon 
good faith, and if it is agreed to resolve those doubts 
by means of compromising the claim, the fact that judicial 
developments or other sources of knowledge may subsequently 
reveal to the parties that the claim was unfounded will not 
justify invalidating the compromise. The validity of a 
compromise is not impaired by the fact that the compromise 
resolved issues differently than a court might have. 
If a compromise is based on a claim asserted in good 
faith, the compromise agreement will not be regarded as void 
for lack of consideration merely because it ultimately 
appears that the claim could not have been sustained at 
law. This is so since if the right to compromise a claim 
depended upon an ultimate judicial decision as to the validity 
of the claim, a compromise, instead of being a means of 
avoiding or ending litigation would be only an additional 
complication in the progress of it; if the validity of a 
compromise depended upon which party was actually right, 
the very object of a compromise which the law favors— 
avoiding the necessity of having a court resolve uncer-
tainties—would be defeated. 15 A. Am. Jur. 2d §17, pp. 
789-790. (Emphasis added). 
This general principle has been applied by a host of courts to 
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family settlement agreements. See cases listed at 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 
at 91 and 29 A.L.R.3d 174, at 202. See also Columbia Union National 
Bank v. Bundschu, 641 S.W. 2d 864 (Mo. App. 1982); Howard 
v. C.I.R., 447 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971); Morris v. Leverett, 434 
P.2d 912 (Okla. 1967); Hughes v. Betenbough, 373 P.2d 318 (N.M. 1962); 
and Weade v. Weade, 150 S.E. 238 (Va. 1929). Some courts even go 
further and hold that the mere agreement to settle a dispute between 
members of a family is itself sufficient consideration regardless 
of their good faith since it is important to have tranquility within 
a family, prevent further litigation, and preserve family property. 
Clark v. Clark, 288 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1979). 
The application of the "good faith" doctrine is in line with 
this Courtfs recent decision in the Matter of the Estate of Frank 
Chasel, supra. Basically that decision states that parties to a family 
settlement agreement must take their chances as to future events and 
cannot later reverse their positions because facts or legal conclu-
sions have changed. Under the appellants1 "bona fide" approach the 
Chasel case would be decided differently since it would be determined 
that an error had been made in concluding the will had been lost and 
therefore there was no "bona fide" forebearance given at the time of 
the agreement justifying adequate consideration. 
Applying the two doctrines to this case also shows a clear 
difference. Under the "good faith" approach it is only necessary to 
look at the parties and what they did at the time of the transaction. 
For example, look at the letters and legal memoranda written by Mr. 
Salisbury as to his concerns of the various claims being asserted. 
To use the "bona fide" approach, however, requires the moving party 
to bring in witnesses such as Mr. Benavince to argue as to whether the 
claims and concerns of the parties at the time the agreement was 
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entered into were reasonable and contained merit. As noted earlier, 
this in effect required a trial on the very issues the Family Settle-
ment Agreement is designed to resolve. 
In any event, whichever standard is adopted in Utah the evidence 
in this case shows that both bona fide and reasonable claims were 
asserted and that they were asserted in good faith by the parties. 
This evidence will now be disoussed. 
B. The Evidence in This Case Justified the Lower 
Court's Conclusion That Defendants Asserted 
Good Faith Claims and Also Justifies the Finding 
That There were Bona Fide Claims. 
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that if any estate 
case could ever be considered unpredictable and complex this is the 
one. The decedent left assets in Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the 
United States. He executed both a "U.S. Will"and a "Philippine Will". 
He also executed a trust agreement. His assets consisted of every-
thing from the usual real estate, stocks, bonds, and partnership 
interests, to the unusual pig and pearl farms. The decedent had 
married twice, and had two children from each marriage, some living 
in the United States and some living in the Philippines. The decedent 
himself was a resident of the United States but had lived for over 
thirty years in the Philippines maintaining a home in Tooele. All of 
these facts certainly justified the conclusions by the various 
attorneys who testified that this was a very complex and difficult 
estate to settle and involved many difficult and complex questions. 
Appellants argue that there was no evidence that the defendants 
asserted valid claims at the time the Family Settlement Agreement 
was being negotiated and then cite several areas of testimony by the 
defendants. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 62-63). Rather than explaining 
how these statements were made in their correct context Defendants 
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shall merely state evidence in their favor which amply supports the 
lower court's Findings. 
1. The Defendants Had a Bona Vide Claim Asserted in Good Faith 
that Mr. Grimm's Divorce was Invalid. Mr. Holbrook testified that in 
his meeting with Mr. Salisbury the question of the validity of the 
divorce came up. There was a question of the decedent's divorce 
being obtained in Nevada and the issue is whether or not under 
Nevada law the residency had been properly obtained in order to make 
the divorce valid. (TRB 879). There was also a claim that a mis-
representation of the assets had been made at the time the divorce 
was entered into. (TRB 880). Mr. Salisbury was concerned enough 
about this claim that he engaged a law firm in Reno to search the 
records and render an opinion as to the validity of the 1947 divorce. 
He stated that he considered the effect of the validity of the 
marriage as one of the elements that would be resolved in an ultimate 
settlement agreement. He received a letter from Nevada counsel on 
January 27, 1978 giving an opinion as to the validity of the divorce. 
Rex Roberts testified that he met with a lawyer friend in Oregon 
concerning the marriage and that this lawyer told him that it was 
entirely possible that Maxine Grimm's marriage was not legal. (TRB 
958). Mr. Roberts admitted that he told Mrsj Grimm and Pete Grimm on 
at least one occasion each that he had questions as to her marriage. 
(TRB 643-44). He told them that if this wer^ the case Juanita Grimm 
would have a 50% interest in the estate. (Id.) 
Mr. Merrill Norman, Plaintiffs1 accountant, testified that if the 
marital deduction utilizing Maxine Grimm's marriage was not allowed 
that the estate tax would go up considerably and that the family 
would collectively become much poorer. (TRB 739). The preceding 
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outline shows that the question of the marriage was adequately 
discussed at the time of the settlement and that the defendants 
had a "reasonable belief" that the claim may have some validity. 
As to the question of being "bona fide" the case of Plunket v. 
Plunket, 283 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1955; holds that in order to obtain a 
divorce in Nevada there must be a bona fide residence. The case 
of Brill v. Brill, 102 P.2d 523 (Cal. 1945) applies Nevada law and 
indicates that under the Nevada code the plaintiff in an action for 
divorce must have resided six weeks in the state before suit is 
brought and that persons residing for the sole purpose of obtaining 
a divorce were not bona fide residents for purposes of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
The case of Howard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 447 F.2d 
152 (5th Cir. 1971) concluded that a bona fide compromise claim existed 
between an ex-wife and ex-husband concerning the validity of a divorce 
which had occurred approximately twenty-one years before. 
2. The Defendants Had a Bona Fide Claim that Mr. Grimm's Trust 
Was Invalid. Mr. Holbrook testified that in his meeting with Mr. 
Salisbury they discussed the validity of the inter vivos trust. (TRB 
877). He wrote to Mr. Roberts in a letter on April 6, 1978 (DX-308). 
In the letter he relates all of the various issues involved in the 
case including domicile, community property ramification, fraudulent 
concealment of the marriage, laches, the validity of the irrevocable 
trust and the validity of the transfers into the trust and the location 
for domicile purposes of the assets. Mr. Salisbury verified that Hol-
brook had claimed he would challenge the validity of the trust that 
had been created in Utah and the circumstances surrounding the trans-
fer of assets. (TRB 118). A memo prepared in Salisbury's office 
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questions the validity of the trust. (DX-24^). 
As to whether such claims were reasonable see the discussion 
supra, Point II. 
3. The Defendants Had a Bona Fide Claim That They Were 
Compulsory Heirs. Once again, Appellants have quoted the evidence 
most favorable to themselves and have ignored all the evidence which 
disputes their contention. During negotiations two facts were admitted 
by all parties: first, that Nita and Ethel were given an interest in 
the "Philippine" estate under the terms of the Philippine will based 
upon the law of legitime; second, the law of legitime established 
a percentage of distribution for all heirs who came under it. Mr. 
Holbrook advised both Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Roberts concerning the 
possibility of asserting a claim to the Philippine assets. (TRB 877, 
885). In the letter to Mr. Roberts Mr. Holbrook states that he was 
awaiting information from Roberts1 Philippine lawyers concerning the 
issue. (DX-308). 
In the meantime Mr. Salisbury had discussed the inheritance 
problem with Maxine and Pete in his office in January and pursuant to 
that conversation initiated research in his office as to the legitime 
and domicile questions. (TRB 81-84). An eight-page legal memorandum 
discussed several issues including the validity of a trust connected 
with more than one jurisdiction as well as the legitime principle 
under Philippine law. Later, he sent a telegram to Mr. Angara who had 
been retained by Mrs. Grimm as her Philippine lawyer. (DX-253). The 
six-page telegram extensively discusses various questions raised con-
cerning domicile, legitime law, validity of trust provisions, and 
the probate code. The telegram concluded with the following: 
There may be some merit after considering all of the 
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs. Grimm to 
try to work out some settlement with the two daughters by 
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the prior marriage as to the percentage of the Philippine 
estate in which they will be entitled to participate, parti-
cularly if the assets in the trust could be left intact. 
A telegram sent by Mr. Angara to Mr. Salisbury discusses the 
conflict of law rule in Utah and states that under the renvoi doctrine 
it is possible that the Philippine estate would be probated in accor-
dance with the Philippine law (including legitime) even if inconsistent 
with Utah law. (DX-253; Findings of Fact No. 34). 
Mr. Salisbury admitted that under the legitime provisions there 
were possibilities under various constructions that the defendants 
could inherit assets in the Philippines. A subsequent legal memorandum 
(DX-255) prepared by a lawyer in Mr. Salisburyfs office concluded 
that if Mr. Grimm was determined to have been domiciled in the 
Philippines at the date of his death the Utah Probate Code would apply 
the Philippine law of descent and distribution to all of his personal 
property. (TRB 109). Mr. Holbrook testified in later conversations 
with Salisbury that Salisbury said it was in the best interests of 
the estate to settle it quickly and to have a single lawyer proceed 
with the probate and the treatment of the tcix case and marshalling of 
the assets. (TRB 878). The above certainly indicates a "good faith" 
claim on the part of the defendants as to their ability to inherit 
under the Philippine law. Since most of the assets in the estate 
were of personal property including the Everett Steamship contract 
and the Globe stock, it was possible that almost all of the estate 
could wind up in the Philippines subject to the claims of Nita and 
Ethel under the Philippine will. 
The question as to whether the legitime interest in the Philip-
pine estate is "bona fide" does not need to be answered at this point 
since it is extremely complex and space limitation does not permit 
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the required discussion. It is useful, however, to note that the 
Philippine lawyer who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, Emilio 
Benavince, was himself unable to venture an opinion as to whether 
Nita and Ethel would have an interest under the Philippine will. 
The question was asked by Plaintiffs1 counsel: 
Q. Under the non-Philippine will, would Ethel Grimm 
Roberts and Juanita Grimm Morris be entitled to 
receive anything under that will? 
A. I am sorry. You are referring to-n-
Q. I am referring to the non-Philippihe will. 
A. I think that might be an easier relating to the 
construction of this will. I am not prepared to 
give an opinion on it. (TRB 372). 
In another discussion with defense counsel the witness was asked 
whether if a person was domiciled in one country but a citizen of 
another country would give rise to a question of conflict of laws. 
He replied: 
The question is a question that would require qualifi-
cation. And if I were to say yes, the answer would be wrong. 
If I were to say no, the answer would be as wrong. If you 
want a wrong answer, I will give it to you. (TRB 387). 
Defendants would refer this Court to the cross-examination of 
Mr. Benavince by defense counsel as to the ipter relationship between 
the legitime Philippine law, domicile, and the doctrine of renvoi. 
(TRB 374-400). In addition, the arguments of defense counsel to 
the court concerning this issue also explains the position taken by 
Defendants as to why a valid claim was being asserted under the 
Philippine will. (TRB 771-79). 
The preceding discussion concerning the law of legitime illus-
trates why the f,bona fide" dispute approach is not satisfactory. A 
complex and difficult matter of law was presented to the lower court 
to decide an issue which is in effect a hypothesis as to what would 
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have happened had the parties continued to litigate. The court is 
thus being forced to make a declaratory judgment in order to deter-
mine the merits of the settlement agreement. It is far better to 
only examine the first portion of the question which is whether at 
the time of the negotiations the parties believed a substantial 
question existed even if the claim is later shown to be invalid. In 
any event, however, under either standard there is clear evidence 
that the parties in this case were making good faith and bona fide 
claims based upon the advice of attorneys and other professionals. 
The very fact that the attorneys themselves believed it to be in 
the best interests of all parties to settle the dispute obviously shows 
that they believe there were some merits in them thereby certainly 
verifying that consideration was being exchanged for the Family 
Settlement Agreement. Howard v. C.I.R., 447 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971). 
In addition, the requirement of a "good faith controversy" required 
by Section 75-3-1102 was certainly met. 
POINT VI 
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT COMPLIED WITH 
RULE 52 U.R.C.P. AND PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The last point urged by the appellants is that the lower court 
findings contained omissions, half-truths and unsubstantiated conclu-
sionary statements. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 64-73) . Little comment 
is needed here. First, while there may be several "conclusionary 
findings" contained near the end of the document there are obviously 
numerous factual findings which provide the basis for such conclusions. 
Each of the findings has been documented by the defendants to refer to 
the transcript references and exhibit references supporting the state-
ments . 
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Second, while it would no doubt be ideal for the state trial 
courts to be able to prepare their own findings of fact and conclusions 
of law economic reality prevents this from occurring since to do so 
a trial court would have to take many days away from the bench to 
prepare findings in this type of complex and lengthy litigation. 
There is no doubt, however, that the lower court was fully aware 
of all of the arguments being made throughout the proceedings by 
counsel and was carefully reviewing the legal arguments each night. 
See e.g., TRB 809-824; 833-34; 844-52; 856; 1119-26. This case 
was not decided in a vacuum and the lower court knew exactly what 
the issues were at the time the decision was made. 
This Court has held that although findings should be made on all 
material subordinate and ultimate factual issues, it is not necessary 
that the court resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues and the 
court is not required to negate allegations in its findings of fact. 
Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980). The majority of Plaintiffs 
argument is their disagreement with the evidence as viewed by the court 
and by the defendants. Obviously, with a record of this size numerous 
additional items could be quoted and other items could be omitted 
depending upon the ultimate conclusion to be reached. Here, the 
conclusion was reached contrary to the Plaintiffs1 position as was the 
prerogative of the court. Plaintiffs cannot now cite those references 
favorable to themselves and claim error as long as there is substantial 
evidence to support the court's findings. Moreover, these findings 
should not be disturbed on appeal except to prevent manifest injustice. 
Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Jackson v. Jackson, 
617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). 
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CROSS APPEAL 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DEFENDANTS 
THE REASONABLE ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED TO ENFORCE 
THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Defendants have cross appealed from the order of the lower court 
entered April 29, 1986 denying Defendants1 claim for attorneys1 fees. 
(CR 1271). The Family Settlement Agreement provides: 
In the event any legal action is required to 
enforce or interpret the provisions of this Agreement, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all 
costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
(Para. 14C, PX 58). 
This Court has held that attorneys1 fees should be awarded for the 
"successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of 
[the] agreement." Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). 
As such, therefore, Defendants were entitled to be awarded the 
reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in the enforcement of the Family 
Settlement Agreement. 
The decision of the lower court as to attorneys1 fees should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was literally inundated with hundreds of exhibits, 
many volumes of pleadings and many days of testimony. The case is 
replete with numerous legal issues some of international concern. The 
lower court after listening to the evidence concluded that the 
plaintiffs were bound by the agreement they had voluntarily negotiated 
over a two to three month period with the assistance of numerous 
lawyers and other advisors. 
The decision of the lower court was sound and is supportable 
as has been previously stated through the various sections of this 
Brief. The decision enforcing the Family Settlement Agreement 
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should be affirmed. The lower court erred, however, in failing 
to award attorneys1 fees to the defendants Who prevailed in their 
claim under the Family Settlement Agreement and as to that order 
it should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW,/ CI1RIST!ENSEN & MARTINEAU 
R. Brent Stephens 
and 
/4^H^ 
Craig S f Cook 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES 
75-3-912. Private agreements among successors to decedent 
binding on personal representative.--Subject to the rights of 
creditors and taxing authorities, competent successors may agree 
among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts to 
which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under 
the laws of .intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written 
contract executed by all who are affected by its provisions. The 
personal representative shall abide by the tbrms of the agreement, 
subject to his obligation to administer the estate for the benefit 
of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, and 
to carry out the responsibilities of his office for the benefit of 
any successors of the decedent who are not parties. Personal 
representatives of decedents1 estate are not required to see to 
the performance of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person 
who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a 
testamentary trust are successors for the purposes of this section. 
Nothing contained in this section relieves trustees of any duties 
owed to beneficiaries of trusts. 
75-3-1101. Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts, 
inalienable interests, or interests of third persons.--A compromise 
of any controversy as to admission to probata of any instrument 
offered for formal probate as the will of a decedent, the construction, 
validity, or effect of any probated will, the rights or interests in 
the estate of the decedent, any successor, op the administration of 
the estate, if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for that 
purpose, is binding on all the parties thereto, including those 
unborn, unascertained, or who could not be located. An approved 
compromise is binding even though it may affect a trust or an 
inalienable interest. A compromise does notj impair the rights of 
creditors or of taxing authorities who are not parties to it. 
75-3-1102. Procedure for securing court approval of compromise.— 
(1) The procedure for securing court approval of a compromise 
is as follows: 
(a) The terms of the compromise shall be "set forth in an agree-
ment in writing which shall be executed by ajll competent persons 
jnd parents acting for any minor child having beneficial interests or 
having claims which will or may be affected by the compromise. 
Execution is not required by any person whose identity cannot be 
ascertained or whose whereabouts is unknown £nd cannot reasonably be 
ascertained. 
(b) Any interested person, including tjie personal representative 
or a truee, then may submit the agreement to the court for its approval 
and for execution by the personal representative, the trustee or 
every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and repre-
sentatives. 
(c) After notice to all interested persons or their represen-
tatives, including the personal representative of the estate and all 
affected trustees of trusts, the court, if it finds that the contest 
or controversy is in good faith and that the effect of the agree-
ment upon the interests of persons represented by fiduciaries 
or other representatives is just and reasonable, may make an order 
approving the agreement and directing all fiduciaries under its 
supervision to execute the agreement. Minor children represented 
only by their parents may be bound only if their parents join with 
other competent persons in execution of the compromise. Upon 
the making of the order and the execution of the agreement, all 
further disposition of the estate is in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement. 
November 17, 1977 
Dear K&xlne, 
1 do not care to cause you additional problems at this 
tine, but Nita and I decided while she was here that we would 
wait for you to approach us as ycu indicated you would when you 
asked us to trust you regarding our interests in our father's 
estate. 
However, it is obvious that you do not intend to include 
us in your arrangements in as much as you have not mentioned the 
subject since Nita left, and that you continue to conceal from us 
your intentions and plans regarding his affairs, particularly with 
regard to your hopefully obtaining a Vill from my father in the 
future. 
It is a shock to Kite and me to learn about your Trust 
which I understand deliberately eliminates her completely and 
includes me for US$10,000. Is this a fair and proper share of 
my father's estate? 
In order to evaluate this situation prior to taking legal 
action I request that you furnish me with a copy of this Trust. 
Also I want a list of all assets wherever, and to the best of your 
knowledge a list of all known outstanding oblioations owino by his 
•state. I would like to have this by Monday at the latest. 
Maxine, I hope that we will be able to work out something 
that will not involve court procedure. We both understand what 
this will mean, but I can see that you are giving us no other 
option. 
Sincerely, 
oooooi 
Text of letter from Linda Grimm to Ethel Roberts: 
December 2, 1977 
From Hong Kong to San Francisco 
Via PAA 
Dear E^hel, 
I wanted to write and thank you for all the help you gave 
Mom and Dad while Dad was in the hospital, especially before I 
came. I had intended to write you from Utah, but before I got a 
chance to I was in Manila. I also v/ant to thank you for inviting 
me over for lunch. I really enjoyed it- and the talk we had. 
I asked Mom why she told you she knew nothing about a 1959 Will 
after I had already told you I knew Pete had found one. She 
actually didn't remember anything about it. So, I don't want you 
to think she didn't want you to know about it. I think all the 
pressure was building up. I wilL have Pete send you what info we 
find as soon as we get things straightened around. 
We're now on our way to San Francisco. Itfs an 11 hr. flight 
from Hong Kong. 
Thanks again for your help. I'll write you again from Utah. 
Love, SGD Linda 
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Dear Family of Roberts, 
Linda and I.arrived safely on Friday and .spent.the next day 
selecting a very nice coffin* I wish .they had had one like that 
In Manila* Earl and teVar really made *Grandpa l,ook very nice* 
He was dressed In his Tesple clothing and lookecj very much at 
peace—so much better than In Manila* Ve had the services on 
Monday and people came from, far off* < The Church was full—the 
same .as at Manila and there were very beautiful flowers* I , 
brought some to the house so they would not freeze and they are 
still very fresh* The orchids tha^ I brought—ths florist, made 
a beautiful spray for the casket and a basket which we put under 
the picture that Jess had made—a very nice picture—I will bring 
one for you If you like* Aleo we taped the services and I will 
bring .It .so yon can hear It* Linda talked as In Manila• Bete and 
his friend sang—I played for them* Everyone eald it* was the 
nicest funeral they had ever attended* Cordon Hinckley, who Is 
one of the Twelve Apostles $ spoke* Free* Wilkinson, who was 
Free* of the BYU Is going to print the program up for us* I will 
bring It also* Ares* Oakes of the BYU came to the funeral as 
did Billy Casper and many very prominent people from around hers-
Nlta and Bob and Mike and Janet and Krle came* I was so happy 
that they did* Nlta and Kris stayed over night—I had hoped 
that they could stay longer* Kris is radiant* I was so pleased tc 
see her that way* Ve also found Carol In ths 9*F* airport and 
had a good visit with her* She looked (rreat—radiant like Krle, 
so I guess thsy are both very happy and that Is good** Ve were 
so lucky to see Carol* VI Hader came over from Colorado* 
There have been some very nice articlee written—Linda is going 
to make a book with all of them plus pictures* I will enclose 
one that was written* I might mention that the orchids are 
O still ftesh—I took some to my niece who is in the hospital and 
€2 a ftrlend who le dying of cancer* 
^ I am mending this with my cousin who la Father of Valeria 
;~ Vhiehouse—you could send a letter back with them* I would 
*^ think that the post office is very confused at thia time* 
I an sorry that we ar* not there for Chrlstnas. It had 
looked ae If ' nijrht all have a very happy Ch itmas together-
one never know* what Is going to, happen these uwys. 
Fste and I plan to cone to Manila after the first of the 
year. When do you Intend to leave? Ve would like to get there 
before that tine if possible. 
Linda has gone back to work. They were oertainly happy' to 
have her return.* Bate is taking final exanst I don't know how 
he Is going to cone outf for he has been out of school for at 
'least 2 weeks. He won't be able to graduate ae he has one nore 
quarter to go. 
Ve hope that you will all have the Best Christmas that is 
possible. He are hoping w* night hAve a white Chrlstnas9 but so 
far it is the weather is sunny and clear. Today it was 601 very 
slid for this tine of year* 
Marie. don't forget to send ne those measurements. 
Thank you so nuch for taking care of everything. I really 
appreciate your help. 
Love to AH9 
1st 
• - v I r-f | • i r\ —»r- i* 
December H, 1977 
Deer Maxina, 
I want to thank you and Linda for your niea lettars to us 
all. I am sura you hava baan Tary buay vith tha funeral and 
gat tine eattlad bafcra Chriatxnaa. 
I hare baan tryina to halp Praesy gat thank you notas out 
to paopla who helpad. Lattara of condolence ara atill caning in. 
Va vill aava them for you ao you vill knew. Praairy alao put a 
acta of thanks in tha nevspapar which ia tha cnatonary thing to 
do hara. I thinfc all ia in ordar. 
Lily callad up yastarday and aaid thara ver<* mar. diving undar 
tha Lanikal ac Rax want ever to chaaa them off. Kov could anyona 
&•% anything in that vatar, ouch laaa lira to tall of it? Sex 
aaid ararrthincr alae is c.k. 
Tha girla ara gatting vary axeitad about Christmas. Joanna 
ia laaving tcmcrrcv with tha baby ao our house vill ba ouch quietar 
vithout Paul. Mrs. V^rrin^ sends ua a big Christmas traa aach yaar 
from Mindanao. Va ara vary lucky sinca it ia illagal to cut thea 
on Luton. 
About our problem, I am still rary such ccroerned. I am 
veiling to hear hcv you plan to probata my father's estate, and 
I hepa you are sanding Schedule A aa you promised. It vill ba 
battar for ua all to aattla thia situation amicably. 
I hopa you, Linda and Pata hava aa nice a Christmas aa you 
can under tha ciifuaataneas. I knev you vill mlas my father Tary 
such aa va shall loo. It still does not seem possible ha ia gone. 
With loYe from us all. 
December 15, 1977 
Dear Maxme, 
It seems hard for me to believe that it has been ten days since I 
was with you in Utah. The empty feeling of losing Daddy is so 
prevalent... I cannot believe that I can no longer tell him in 
person of the great love I have always had fpr him. 
I want you to know that I thought the services in Tooele were 
lovely. The tremendous tributes paid to Daddy by your friends 
there were over-whelming... the graciousness and thoughtful ex-
pressions of sympathy extended to me by so many of Daddy's friends 
were so appreciated not only by me, but also by Bob, Mike and Janet. 
We are all so appreciative of your generous pffer to bring us all 
to Tooele* 
My flight back to San Jose was a good one (and a funny one) * In 
order to get a seat by myself I practically $at in the kitchen -
and they were training new personnel!. It was almost as good *as a 
circfcs. The flight that Kris chose to return to SF was delayed for 
over an hour...her poor Mike, probably thought he had lost his bride 
forever! 
I went up and saw Kris in her new apt. a few days after my return. 
I am sure that after she gets it fixed up that it will be a decorator 
showpiece. She has the knack of taking an old crate and making it 
look like something out of the finest furniture shop. Their apt. 
reminds me of Nana's house...small rooms, high ceilings, etc. 
Remembering all the promises that we made to each other when I was 
leaving Tooele, I am trying to live up to mine! I wrote notes of 
thanks to both Norma and LaVar... and I thank again whoever it was 
that returned LaVar's jeep to him. I hope that Pete has time to make 
the cassette recording of the service for me. Or, if you would prefer, 
would you send me a copy of Bro. Hinkley's speech. It was so nice. 
I would like to hear Linda again... she was so wonderful, and what a 
beautiful talent she has to get up and speak so well in front of a 
f—• large group of people - especially at a time like that. I hope Maxine 
I that you will send me a copy of Daddy's will very soon. You told me 
I that^  Ethel and I were mentioned in it and it is very important to me 
I to knew details at this time. Bob and I are in the midst of formulating 
I new wills and trusts for ourselves and our lawyer asked me the other 
I day if I had any interests outside of this country, and as I started 
I to think over the matter I said quite possibly I would. Since we 
I began this project last September we are most anxious to have it com-
I pie ted. Please let me know if there is anything I can do to help. 
I have tried twice in person to get ahold of Elsa, and will continue. 
Although she told me to call her, I question if she hears the telephone 
for I have called early in the day and late' too. I understand that she 
goes "out to lunch downtown" everyday. Apparently this is not done at 
a conventional hour because the day that Carol and I were in SF she was 
leaving for downtown and it was 3:00 in the afternoon. This is my last 
week of Work before "having two weeks off for Christmas vacation and I 
plan to go to SF next Tuesday, and will try again. If I do not catch 
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her in person I shall leave a large note taped to her door. Maybe I 
shall be lucky and get a response!!! 
I trust that Pete is back at school taking his finals and Linda back 
at the gym in Salt Lake. I.enjoyed seeing them both so very much... 
I wish that it had all happened during a happier time, but the short 
time I had with each of them was delightful. 
Did I tell you that our cabin had been broken into. Kris and Mike, 
when they went there for their honeymoon, were greeted with no power 
and a mess left by our uninvited visitors. Whoever the person(s) were, 
went in and got very sick during their stay....consequently, Kris and 
Mike brought me LOADS of washing to do. They of course didn't know all 
that we had in the cabin so couldn't really tell if anything had Been 
stolen. Bob and I went up over the weekend to finish cleaning up, re-
pair leeks, nail things closed and take inventory. The only real theft 
was the taking of all my first aid equipment, and because of the locatio 
of the place I had everything for bee-stings, to slings, etc.. ••they eve 
took my treasured bottle of Ute-sol! They completely went through every 
drawer leaving them topsy-turvy, drank all our soft drinks, and shot 5 
bullet holes in the ceiling (which of course went through the roof).... 
Needless to say Robert is not too happy about that!!! This is the first 
time I haven't been too mad about the drought - I don't want rain in 
my house! - and, it's hard to repair a metal roof. 
We did bring our usual load of Christmas trees home for ourselves, the 
stores, the mothers, and a few special friends. I put up ours and it 
is pretty. Tonight we are having Kris and Mike for dinner, for I guess 
what you would call an early Christmas, since they will be heading back 
to his folks place. 
I must run for now... just wanted you to know that I am thinking of you 
and hope that things are going a bit more smoothly. We have all been 
over a pretty rough road lately... I am sure though that love and friend 
can help, make it smoother. Thank you in advance for sending me tne will 
and again thank you for your generousity in bringing us all to Utah. 
The children are most grateful to have been able to have been there. 
Please tell your caretaker's wife (Lynn?) that I delivered her gifts to 
her parents. They were pleased to hear from her. 
I am enclosing this letter in a card done by one of my former students.. 
needless to say, 1 am quite proud of her, and delighted to know that 
maybe I was a small part of her success... I must admit however that 
she was born with a tremendous talent! 
Take good care of yourself Maxine, and do le't me hear from you soon. 
Much love from all of us, J"""\ % , 
PS -rrl forgot to mention my new wooden tea set. . .1 have a.perfect place . 
to display it in our new kitchen and it looks great! Thanks so much.... 
The tea set is the first pieces of the inlaid wooden ware that I have, 
so I am truly delighted. 
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l>ec»r Kaxlne* 
Just a note to report on my trip t o San Francisco yesterday.••• 
1 finally got to see Elsa. Z am c onvinced that she has been 
at home the other times that Z ha^  a tried, but she simply canft 
hear, (While Z vas there someone came to the door "and cranked 
that bell*,,, itfe so loud Z thouc ht the vhole house vas going 
to come dovn around us, and she d: dn9t even hear it! I 111), She 
von9t have an extension put on he: telephone either $ so that is 
still out in the front hall and s> a keeps the front part of the 
house closed of f $ so there is litt le chance of getting ahold of 
her. Finally the neighbors sav mj out in front of iher house 
and came out to ask me vhat Z vant ed. After telling them vho 
Z vas her one neighbor told me thz t she had a key to the house 
and vould let me In. That is hov I finally got tocher. (Need-
less to say, Z have given my name *nd address to ttyat neighbor 
and have ksked that they call me i f they ever suspect that any-
thing Is vrong vlth her,) She vas delighted to se^me and ve 
had a nice visit, Z took her a pcinsetta and she ifas delighted 
to have •a Christmas thing*,,*., cily $ cards sat ^n too of the 
table,,,, a very sad setting - the poinsetta helped I i. 
Regarding the house• Slsa told me that C d H holds all of her 
Pcpers (they apparently take very good care of their employees) ,.# 
She told me that Nana had willed the house to her and that she 
intum has villed it to Freda, anc thai Frank and MaryLou vill 
get it. She says it is in her na*ef arid that she gets the tax 
bill each year in her name, and she pays the taxes on it III 
I didnot feel that Z could questioi her vord, 
giving 
Regarding the help that Daddy vas At&d/fM her9 she also in can* 
versation told me that she plans to return to Spain at least once 
more - probably leaving after the first of the year,, and she vent 
or, to tell me that she had a good income vlth plenty left-over for 
travel • etc. 
Z also vent to see Fred yesterday. Z alvays take blm a poinsetta 
each year,,*, hevs alvays pleased and looks forvard tp it. He vas 
just getting ready to be picked up by his lady friend ^ vho vas taking 
him to her house for dinner, Z stayed long enough )to mept har, and 
traded names and addresses vlth her too. (The lady has. an Incredlb! 
resemblance to Alice - short# short cropped vhite hair/ pleasant 
face and engaging smile.) Z vould guess she is inlher early 60's -
* very active real estate salesvoman. Khile she vaa there Fred told 
me that he guessed he should give me a key to his house so Z could 
get in incase anything happened to him..••« she said;*You ehould gl\ 
me one toot19... Fred saidf "If Z give you one, you4,11 come in and ta 
my chair t* - At that point Fred vfent in his room for a minute and sh 
turned to me and said* "You knov honeyf if Z just get that chair 1*1 
be happy I* She said this as she vas patting my arj* • Ididnft comma 
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I really felt that I had a good visit vith both of the-u and a* 
delighted to have some insight on hov to keep in touch Yith them, 
1 think that ve are most fortunate to have them both in good 
health and vith no apparent financial needs* 
1 trust you received mp letter of December 15th* Z am vatching 
the mall box closely each day aval ting your ansverf 
I assume that Kristine is back vith Mike's family by nov. She 
vas to leave last Monday Z believe* Z received a Christmas card 
from Mikefs mother In which she told me she vas giving a party 
to introduce Kris to their friends • she is having 70 people in • 
poor Kris - you know hov she hates crcvds!!!! Mike and Kris vere 
down for dinner the other night*.•• It vas an -early Christmas* fc 
them* Then last Sunday ve entertained Bob9s employees along vith 
their spouses* girl/boy friends, etc* He had 45 here in our nev 
•small* house***** it vas cozyI Bob doesnot believe in "store 
parties" at the store, so ve do it at the house* Z think he is 
right after reading for years about the harm that comes from offic 
parties • but it is a chore! Thank goodness Jannie vas here to he 
me*/» betveen Jannle and my microvave all vent veil, but Zvm exhau 
Ve are planning a very quiet Christmas - just the grandmothers and 
Bob9s sister vill be here for dinner on Christmas Day* Z still 
have shopping to do9 and am trying to send out a fev Christmas car 
to close friends* Z'm keeping busy! and, looking forvard to doing 
very little the veek after Christmas!!!!! 
Kaxine* please keep in touch and let me hear from you soor.* Also, 
please let me knov about Daddyfs papers that Z asked ypu for* 
Thanks again• and as Z said in my last letter* if there is anythin 
Z can do to help just let me knov* 
Regards to Pete and Linda* and rsuch lave to you all* 
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November 10t 1978 
Dear Maxine* 
I was dismayed when you walked out on us during the 
meeting yesterday morning* L can't understand what you are 
trying to accomplish and whether you are truly sincere or not 
when you say you are completing the accounting and will have 
it finished by the time Salisbury gets here* And I can't unde 
stand why any mention of accounting should upset you so much a 
whey you should take it so personally when you are in fact dea 
solely with Estate funds* 
As you and Pete are the only ones with access to Estate 
funds it is no more than natural that Nita and I would want to 
know what is being disbursed and for what* We really have no 
idea of what Santillan is doing either, aside from your person-
records • Further I think you are making a mistake trying to 
use Santamaria stockbrokers as a bank* Estate funds must and 
should be very well accounted for* 
Pete told us you have not been feeling well and I hope 
you are better today* Is there anything I can do? perhaps yoi 
and Pete are trying to do too much yourselves when you should 
be having much more professional help* 
Sincerely* 
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Text of letter from Maxine Grimm to Ethel Roberts, handwritten while 
on Pan American Airways, December 2, 1977: 
Dearest Ethel -
Please forgive me for blowing up - 1 was so ashamed. I hadn't 
slept nor had I eaten and I was just not prepared to confront you. 
I am especially sorry about what I said ctbout Linda being asked to 
lunch. I didn't really believe that - Linda and I changed our plans 
so she could go - I was especially happy for her to do so - maybe I 
had wished I had been asked also. 
I'm also sorry about all the mixup on the Will bit. I don't 
really think I knew what I was saying. I'm still confused over it 
so I shall wait until I get to Utah and write you from there. 
Linda was sick with a high fever and we slept little - had to 
find sweaters for warmth and now we are on a 747 straight for S.F. 
- 11*5 hours. It is full as JAL was on strike and they put the 
passengers on this flight. 
I still do not have things in their proper perspective - it 
will take some time, but I especially hope that we can keep the 
girls from losing faith in their Grandfather. They had enough 
qualms over their father - I would like to spare them any more. 
I just hope we can be the best of friends. I plan to spend 
more time in Manila and I really need your friendship and help. 
If I have not returned before you leave, let us know your plans 
Perhaps you could come to Utah? 
I hope that from now on I won't have to say anything about 
religion. Had I been doing instead of talking I would have been 
better off. It is good that we can always change. 
I never realized until yesterday the impact of your feeling 
about disinheritance. I wish now I had insisted on knowing more. 
You have already learned this lesson. If you recall, you were the 
one to warn me. 
I was so sure your Daddy would live to straighten out all the 
problems. Perhaps he died so we could become big enough to solve 
them ourselves. I am sure we can. 
I left wheat, wheat germ and flour in the lower refrigerator. 
Would you take out what you want. As I mentioned there will always 
be plenty of duck eggs. 
Thanks Ethel - I'll write after the funeral. I'll tape it so 
you may hear it sometime. 
Thanks so much for your support during those trying days. 
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(Signed) Maxine 
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May 4, 1978 
Mr, Jose C. Florento 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
8th Floor, Rufino Building 
Ayala Avenue, Makati 
Metro Manila 
Dear Mr. Florento, 
With reference to OUT Meeting this Morning, May 4, it is our understanding 
that you and your firm would be willing to handle the accounting work that we 
feel we need in order to settle the estate in the Philippines of the late 
Edward Miller Grim, and that you will work with our attorneys in the Philippines 
and whomever we May designate in the United States or elsewhere to coordinate 
on Philippine related matters. 
We understand that your fees will run from ?20 to P250. per hour, depending 
on the personnel involved. 
We would appreciate your billing us on a Monthly basis for all work 
performed up to date, and we hope that we will be able to pay you as billed. 
If this does not conform with your understanding please let us know, 
otherwise we will consider that we will have your complete cooperation and 
assistance in this matter. 
If for any reason either party should decide to terminate this agreement 
30 days notice will be required. 
fc E C E 1 V E L 
Very truly yours. 
•C£ .•'. L. * •= 
Marine Tate Grimm 
/i 
Ethel Grim Rofc*rtB 
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Saturday, September 29 
Dear Maxine, 
I have been trying to reach you for several days and 
have been unable to do so* 
I am very concerned about the closure of the Santamaria 
Brokerage Office which as you know occurred Monday of this week* 
I can only assume from the fact that you have not contacted me 
that all of the Estatefs stocks and/or deposits are intact, or 
I would have heard from you* 
However, I must insist that you furnish me immediately, 
today, a complete accounting of all of the Philippine stock assets 
which have been in your care and custody since my fatherfs death* 
The accounting should include all dividends, cash and stock* 
Also I want to see the stock certificates that you are 
holding* 
And please as I have requested before, I must again ask 
you for the accounting files which I turned over to Pete and was 
assured would be returned to me on request* I have had your 
continual promise but no files* 
I am still waiting for you to come by to sign the BIR 
paper so I can return it to the BIR for their signature and 
acknowledgement of taxes paid* Attorney Salisbury needs this 
paper for the IRS in the United States* 
Sincerely, 
4* 
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October 1f 1979 
jjear i^ thel, 
I just received your letter of September 29th. 
«KS to the filk papers which require my signature, 
I shall appreciate it if you can send them to me. I 
will return them right «>way. 
AS I understand it we have already paid the BIR 
about JM.9 million, aside from the representation expenses 
in the sum of r^OOT. 
However, I received today a notice of assessment 
dated September 7, 1979 for JM ,568t029«64f inquiring if 
the estate has already paid said sum of money. I then 
need the BIR receipts so that I may fill out the BIR 
form* 
/is to the other things stated in your letter, we are 
still wording on them, since we shall soon have the actual 
partition, all those other matters mentioned by you shall 
be taken care of. 
To complete my records, 1 also need copies of your 
check and that issued by Atty. W. Limqueco, which checks 
were both paid to the BIk. 
Sincerely, 
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DAVID E . SALISBURY 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY 
1 4 2 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT U K E CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
MRS MAXINE TATE GRIMM HAS ENGAGED OUR SERVICES AS 
COUNSEL TO HANDLE PHILIPPINE END IN THE SETTLEMENT OF 
ESTATE OF HER LATE HUSBAND, CERTAIN QUESTIONS NEED TO 
BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE HOW THE INTERESTS OF 
THE ESTATE VILL BZ BEST AND MOST ECONOMICALLY SERVED 2996 
COL 141 84111 
PACE2/-70 
<AA) THE DETERMINATION OF THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT 
I S THE CRUCIAL THRESHHOLD QUESTION UNDER PHILIPPINE 
LAV, THE CROSS ESTATE OF A DECEDENT DOMICILED IN THE 
PHILIPPINES VILL INCLUDE ALL PROPERTY, REAL OR PERSONAL, 
TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE; WHEREVER SITUATED, EXCEPT REAL 
PROPERTY SITUATED OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE CASE OF 
ONE NOT DOMICILED IN THE COUNTRY, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
I S INCLUDED IN THE GROSS ESTATE ONLY IF SITUATED IN THE PHILIPPINES 
COL (AA> 
PACEJ/S? 
CONSIDERING THAT TK2 LATE MR. GRIMM WAS A RESIDENT OF 
THE PHILIPPINES FOR MORE THAN FOUR DECADES AND THAT HE 2991 
t*~1tn (MM!) 
HELD A PHILIPPINE PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA AT THE TIME OF 
HIS DEATH, PHILIPPINE LAW WOULD CONSIDER HIM DOMICILED IN 
THE COUNTRY. FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES, THE POSSESSION OF A 
PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA IS CONSIDEREipJONCLUSlVE IN ES-
TABLISHING THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PHILIPPINES 
COL GRIMM 
PACE4/M 
(BB) THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL CONSEQUENCES UNDER 
PHILIPPINE LAW FLOWING FROM THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT 
WAS DOMICILED IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH) 
tl) HIS WILL MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROGATE IN THE PHILIPPINES 
t2> HIS CROSS ESTATE WILL INCLUDE tl) REAL PROPERTY LOCATED 
IN THE PHILIPPINES: (III) INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
WHEREVER SITUATED. 
•MM1 (KM* 
<3> THE ESTATE TAX IS 6 0 / ON A NET ESTATE OF P E S 0 S 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 
(APPROXIMATELY USDLRS*07,000.00 BASED ON THE CURRENT EXCHANGE 
RATE OF USDLRSl.OO S PES0S7.37) OR ABOVE. 
COL (BB) ( J ) ( 2 ) ( I ) t i l ) 
( I I I ) ( 3 ) 6 0 / PESOSJ,000 ,000 (USDLRS407,000.00 
USDLRSJ.30 I-PESCC7.37) 
PAGE5/52 
PHILIPPINE LAW ONLY IMPOSES AN ESTATE TAXf INHERITANCE 
TAXES WERE ELIMINATED IN A RECENT STATUTE (BUT THE RATES 
OF THE ESTATE TAX WERE APPRECIABLY INCREASED). 
( C O UPON THE OTHER HAND, ASSUMING THAT THF L«.TF MR. 
CRZ"!* MICH? BE ' E l ? TO P p POIICILT !M ?*.LT L*>CE CITY, 
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES! 2$Sit 
COL ( ) (CO X 
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( 1 ) INTANGIBLE PROPERTY WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE CROSS ESTATE 
ONLY IF LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES. 
<2) NO ESTATE TAX SllAll B£ COLLECTED IN RESPECT OF 
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT IF <A> 
US FEDERAL LAV OR UTAH LAW DOES N01 IMPOSE A TRANSFER TAX 
»M«01 (M-H) 
300C 
m 
Htfti 
OR DEATH TAX OF ANY CHARACTER IN RESPECT OF INTANGIBLE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PHILIPPINE CITIZErJS(N^/RESIDIN6 IN UTAH, OR 
COL (1) <2> (A) 
P A C E 7 / M / 5 0 
CB) IF US FEDERAL LAV OR UTAH LAV ALLOWS A SIMILAR 
EXEMPTION FROM TRANSFER TAXES OR DEATH TAXES IN RESPECT OF 
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PHILIPPINE C I T I Z E N S ( f i g ) RESIDING IN 
UTAH. VJTK PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SHARES OF STOCK AND 
BOOTS,(THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE CROSS ESTATE OF A NON-RESIDENT 
rTEcEl 
V ISSUI 
COL <8> 
PASS8/S9/S4 
C DENT* REGARDLESS OF LOCATION A1 THE TINE OF DEATH IF 
S ED BY ANY ENTITY ORGANIZED OR CONSTITUTED IN THE PHILIPPINES 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS LAVS, OR IF ISSUED BY ANY FOREIGN 300; 
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CORPORATION EIGHTY-FIVE PER CEUTUM OF TJC BUSINESS OF 
WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES, OR IF SUCH SHARES OR 
BONDS ISSUED BY A FOREIGN CORPORATION HAVE ACQUIRED A 
BUSINESS SITUS IN THE PHILIPPINES. 
PACE9/105/102 
(CO QUERY* IS THERE ANY ADVANTAGE UNDER UTAH LAW FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAXES IF THE UTE 
MR. CRItIM WOULD BE CONSIDERED DOMICILED IN UTAH AT THE 
TIME OF HIS PEATHt 
<DD) THE PROBATE OF THE WILL EXECUTED BY THE LATE 
MR. GRIMM PERTAINING TO HIS PHILIPPINE PROPERTIES (PHILIPPINE 
WILL, FOR SHORT) DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE DONE IN 
THE PHILIPPINES. THE PHILIPPINE WILL MAY BE PROBATED 
ELSEWHERE. IF THE WILL IS PROBATED ABROAD, PHILIPPINE LAW 
(M»1 (M-W) 
PROVIDES AN EXPEDITIOUS PROCEDURE FOIi T.IZ ALLOWANCE OF A WILL 
ALREADY PROBATED OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE ESTATE THEREUNDER. 
COL (CO <DD) 
PACE 10/72/65 
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, COMPEL IN OUR OPINION 
PROBATE OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE PHILIPPINES, TO UITl 
<1> THE APPARENT INTENT OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PHILIPPINE 
WILL WHICH CONTEMPLATES PROBATE THEREOF IN THE PHILIPPINES AS 
MAY BE GLEANED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE ELEVENTH PARAGRAPH 
OF THE WILL DESIGNATING THE EXECUTORS QUOTE FOR THE PURPOSE 
CF ITS PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES UNQUOTE. 
COL (i) 3003 
NNN 
t *1K1 (RMW 
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nss n wui 17 iou 
PHS SALT LAKE CITT UT 
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DAVID E. SALISBURY 
VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY 
141 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITT, UTAH 84111 
(2) TWO OF THE EXECUTORS NAMED IN THE PHILIPPINE WILL, 
CHARLES PARSONS AND BYRON S. KUIE, ARE RESIDENTS OF THE 
PHILIPPINES, 
(3) THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE MILL ARE 
ALL LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES. 
(4) MRS. ETHEL CRIMM ROBERTS, ONE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF 
THE DECEDENT FROM HIS FIRST MARRIAGE, HAS ALREADY COMMENCE!' 
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS IN A PHILIPPINE COURT. UNDER PREVAILING 
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE, THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE 
OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL SHOULD BE FILED IN THE SAME COURT. 
COL (2) (3> (4) 
PAGE12/98/92 
(EE) A PROBATE OF THE PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE 
PHILIPPINES, HOWEVER, VILL ENTAIL AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN 
AND EXPENSE FOR THE ESTATE ARISING FROM THE FOLLOWING I 
(1) CONSIDERING THAT THE PHILIPPINE WILL WAS EXECUTED IN 
SAN FRANCISCO AND THE RULE UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW THAT THE 
FORMS AND SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAVS 
OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED, COHPLIIANCE WITH 
•*iai (RMD 
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THE REQUIREMENTS OF CALIFORNIA LAW ON THE FORMALITIES 
REQUIRED IN RESPECT OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE WILl 
MUST BE SATISFACTORILY PROVED IN THE PHILIPPINE PROBATE COl'ST. 
COL (EE) ( 1 ) 
P A C E l 3 / 7 3 / « 7 
( 2 ) SINCE THE TVO ATTESTING WITNESSES ARE BOTH RESIDENTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, THEY WILL HAVE TO TESTIFY PERSONALLY 
BEFORE THE PHILIPPINE COURT OR THEIR DEPOSITIONS MUST BE 
TAKEN IN THE UNITED STATES. ~" 
(FF) A SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCE OF THE PROBATE OF THE 
PHILIPPINE WILL IN THE PHILIPPINES IS THE APPLICATION OF TH£ 
UW OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN DETERMINING THE INTRINSIC VALIMTY 
OF THE TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS. 
COL <2> (FF) 
• * 1 « 1 (NMt) 
P A G E U / 9 7 / * * 
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAV, THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION, THE 
AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AND THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY 
OF THE TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS ARE REGULATED BY THE NATIONAL LAW 
OF THE DECEDENT, WHATEVER MAY BE THE NATURE 
OF THE PROPERTY AND REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTRY WHEREIN SAID 
PROPERTY MAY BE FOUND. WITH RESPECT TO AN AMERICAN CITI2EN, THE 
APPLICABLE LAW WILL BE THAT OF THE STATE WHERE HE IS A 
CITI2EN. IN THE CASE OF THE LATE MR. GRIMM, 
WE ASSUME THAT HE WAS A CITI2EN OF THE STATE OF UTAH AT THF 
TIME OF THIS DEATH. 
NNN 
NNNN 
3007 
• * 1 » (*Mt) 
SLA020CU07X1«»11138$C04S)PD 0 2 / 1 7 / 7 8 1107 
ICS IPHIIHB I I S S 
I I S S FN WUI 17 1107 
PMS SALT U K E CITY UT 
UVB935C MNV40! EHA119 
UVNX CV PNMA 389 
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VAN COTT, BASLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY 
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WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, THEREFORE, THE UTAH LAW ON THE 
ORDER OF SUCCESSION AND THE AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL IICHTS, 
PARTICULARLY WHETHER UTAH LAV RECOCNIZES COMMUNITY OF 
PROPERTY BETWEEN SPOUSES AND WHETHER THE SURVIVING SPOUSE 
AND THE CHILDREN ARE CONSIDERED COMPULSORY HEIRS AND, 
•F-1M1 (MM«| 
IF S O , THE AMOUNT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SUCCESSIONAL RICHTS CR 
WHAT -IS KNOWN IN CIVIL LAV AS COMPULSORY LEGITIMES. 
PACE1«/133 /123 
(GG) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PHILIPPINE WILL 
PROVIDES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE VITH 
PHILIPPINE LAW, THIS GOES AGAINST THE RULE UNDER PHILIPPINE 
U V THAT TIE NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT GOVERN* THE 
ORDER OF SUCCESSION, THE AHOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AND THE 
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS. HENCE, 
THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS PROVIDING FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE LAV IN THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF THE ESTATE MAY BE RENDERED INOPERATIVE IF INCONSISTENT VITH UTAH 
U V FOLLOWING A DECISION OF THE PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT TH4T 
A PROVISION IN A FOREIGNER'S WILL TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS 3 < 
•ft-IMI (M-W) 
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PROPERTIES SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PHILIPPIIE 
LAW AND NOT WITH HIS NATIONAL LAV I S ILLEGAL AND VOID FOR HIS 
NATIONAL LAW CANNOT BE IGNORED. 
COL ( C O 
PAGE17/88/85 
PLEASE ADVISE US, THEREFORE, VHETHER THE DISPOSITIONS 
HADE BY THE DECEDENT IN HIS PHILIPPINE WILL IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ARE CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, 
(RH> WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW FROM YOU VHETHER THERE IS 
A CONFLICT OF LAW RULE IN UTAH PROVIDING THAT THE LAW OF THE 
DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT SHALL GOVERN SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS. 
IF THERE IS SUCH A RULE, AND THE PHILIPPINES IS HELD TO BE 
THE DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, 
THE PHILIPPINE COURTS WILL ACCEPT THE RENVOI OR THE 
W.1J01 (NM» 
REFERENCE BACK TO PHILIPPINE UW, IN VHICH CASE THE TESTAMFXTARY 
DISPOSITIONS OF THE LATE MR. GRIMM 
IN MIS PHILIPPINE VILL IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
PHILIPPINE U W EVEN IF INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH 
LAW WILL BE VALID AND OPERATIVE. 
COL (HH> 
PAGElB/101/97 
(II) WE NOW TURN TO THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE TRUST 
AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE LATE MR. GRIMM. 
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW, PROPERTIES TRANSFERRED TO A TRUST 
WHERE THE TRUSTOR RETAINS THE POWER TO REVOKE ARE INCLUDED 
AS PART OF THE GROSS ESTATE IN DETERMINING THE NIT ESTATE SUBJECT 
TO ESTATE TAX. FURTHERMORE, SUCH TRUST PROPERTIES ARE 
SUBJECT TO COLLATION IN DETERMINING THE 
000027 
COMPULSORY LEGITIMES OF THE HEIRS. THUS, IF THE TRANSFER 
IN TRUST AFFECTS THE LEGITIMES OF THE HEIRS, SUCH TRANSFER 
SHALL BE ACCORDINGLY REDUCED} OTHERWISE, THE PROPERTIES HELD 
BY THE TRUSTEE WILL BE LEFT INTACT, 
COL ( I I ) 
NNN 
NNNN 
3012 
SLA012<i023)( l«» i00543G048>PD 0 2 / 1 7 / 7 8 1024 
ICS IPMIIHA IISS 
2ISS FM VUI 17 1024 
PMS SALT LAKE CITY UT 
UVE34C4 HNV402 EHA119 
UVNX CV PNMA 2 1 0 
MANILA (VIA ETPI/MNL) 1 8 7 8 / 1 5 9 $ 17 2 1 4 2 PAGE19/48 PARTS 
DAVID E . SALISBURY 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY 
141 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
QUERY! IS UTAH LAW THE SAME AS PHILIPPINE LAV IN THE 
TREATMENT OF PROPERTIES TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO A REVOCABLF 
TRUST FOR PURPOSES OF ESTATE TAXATION AND COLLATION? 
PLEASE NOTE THAT UNDER THE TRUST AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE 
DECEDENT THE GOVERNING LAV IS THAT OF THE STATE OF UTAH* 3 0 1 . 
wwai mm 
000028 
PAGE20/89 /S7 
FOR YOUR INFORMATION, PHILIPPINE LAW ADOPTS THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE GENERAL LAWS ON TRUSTS AS DEVELOPED BY 
AMRICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND OUR SUPREME COURT HAS 
SELIED ON AMERICAN PRECEDENTS IN CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONS ON TRUST. 
< J J ) WE INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE CODICIL TO THE LAST 
WILLS AND TESTAMENTS OF THE LATE MR. CRIMM. PLEASE 
NOTE THAT THE EXACT SAY OF EXECUTION IN JANUARY 1 9 6 6 I S 
NOT INDICATED. WE SUGGEST THAT MR. KINS EXECUTE AN 
AFFIDAVIT WITH RESPECT TO THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION 
OF THE SAID CODICIL. 
COL ( J J ) 1 9 6 6 
P A G E 2 1 / 7 3 / 7 1 OQ< 
WE SHALL APPRECIATE A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 
•*um (MMti 
PHILIPPINE LAW REQUIRES DELIVERY OF A WILL TO THE COURT BY THE 
EXECUTOR NAMED IN THE WILL WITHIN TWENTY DAYS AFTER HE KNOV3 OF 
THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR OR AFTER HE KNOWS OF HIS APPOINTMENT 
I F HE OBTAINED SUCH KNOWLEDGE AFTER THE DEATH OF 
THE TESTATOR, THE NAMED EXECUTOR IS SUBJECT TO 
A FINE FOR ANY INEXCUSABLE DELAY. 
ESGARDO J . ANGARA 
NNN 
NNNN 
3015 
•F-U01 (RHD 
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February 24, 1978 
CABLE ADDRESS; 
ACRALAW, PHILIPPINES 
Telex: RCA 7222374 
Eastern 3 622 PN 
TO: EDGARDO J. ANGARA 
122 GAMBOA STREET 
LEGASPI, MAKATI 
METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES 
Re your cable of February 24, 1978, I will call you at 1645 
hours (Utah time) on February 24, but will not have had an 
opportunity to do further research in reply to your cable 
just received. 
David E. Salisbury 
SF-1201 (HMD 
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CABLE ADDRESS: 
ACRALAW, PHILIPPINES11 
Telex: RCA 7222374 
Eastern 3 622 PN 
EDGARDO J. ANGARA 
ANGARA, ABELLO, CONCEPCION, REGALA & CRUZ 
122 GAMBOA STREET 
LEGASPI, MAKATI 
METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES 
Your cable of February 17, 1978 was received by us on Friday, February 
We are pleased that you have agreed to represent Mrs. Grimm and the est 
of her late husband. I will endeavor to answer the questions raised by 
your cable, making reference to your lettering system. After receiving 
this if you feel a telephone conference would be advisable, please cabl 
a suitable time. 
(AA) I agree that the domicile of the decedent is the crucial threshol 
question which we must resolve. I am inclined to agree that it will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish his domicile as being other 
than in the Philippines, particularly in view of the information in you 
cable concerning the conclusive presumption where a permanent resident 
visa is held. 
(BB) The consequences under Philippine law flowing from a domicile in 
the Philippines is substantially the same as the conclusion would be 
in the United States if he were domiciled here. My biggest concern is 
the tax rate in the Philippines and whether or not there will be any 
difference in ability to negotiate the amount of the gross estate in th< 
Philippines as compared with the United States. 
(CC) Even assuming a U. S. domicile it would appear to be your conclus: 
under (CC) that the Philippine gross estate will still include a 
substantial portion of the Grimm estate because of the provisions re-
lating to stocks and bonds of Philippine corporations. 
WU 1211 (**-*») 
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With respect to the U. S. law (and any Utah tax is based upon the Feder 
tax determination) the following situation would apply to a Philippine 
citizen and domicile who died a resident of Utah: Stock would only 
be taxed if issued by domestic U. S. corporation and debt obligations 
would be taxed only if issued by U. S. person, corporation or State or 
Federal governmental agency. Funds in U. S. banks and U. S. insurance 
companies would be taxed here including funds in a domestic branch of 
a foreign bank but excluding funds in foreign branches of U. S. banks. 
I am sure you are also familiar with the credit for foreign death 
taxes allowed a U. S. citizen for taxes paid to a foreign jurisdiction. 
This credit is set forth in Section 2014 of the Internal Revenue Code 
and related sections. 
With respect to your query under (CC) concerning the advantage of a 
Utah domicile at the time of death, the principal advantage would be 
that on an estate of $407,000 with at least one-half of the estate 
passing to the widow, the combined Federal estate tax and Utah inheri-
tance tax would be $25,920 with one-half of the excess of the estate 
above this amount being taxed at a 32 percent rate rather than the 
60 percent rate in the Philippines. I have not had an opportunity 
to thoroughly research the double taxation effect if both the 
Philippines and the United States seek a tax on the same estate. 
WU 1211 (ftl-70) 
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(DD) I concur in your opinion that probate of the Philippine Will in 
the Philippines is desirable. We have filed the other Will for probate 
in Utah, together with the codicil and I believe you should also include 
the codicil in the Philippine probate even though it does not affect the 
provisions of the Will. We will endeavor to determine through Mr. King 
the day of the month which should have been filled in on the codicil. 
(EE) With respect to the burden and expense involved in probating the 
Philippine Will in the Philippines, as I indicated in the letter to Mrs. 
Grimm which I am sure you have, both of the attesting witnesses to the 
Philippine Will which was executed in San Francisco are deceased. We 
should be able, however, to prove the validity of the document and the 
compliance with the requirements of California law through the law partner 
of Mr. Roth, the attorney who drafted the Will, who should be able to 
identify the signatures of the attesting witnesses as well as the signatr 
of Mr. Grimm. If you will advise us as to the nature of the information 
you would want included, we can either obtain an affidavit from Mr. Georg 
0. Bahrs, the law partner of Mr. Roth, or we can arrange to take his 
deposition. 
(FF) With respect to the validity of the testamentary provisions of the 
Philippine Will under Utah law you should be aware that as of July 1, 197 
Utah adopted the Uniform Probate Code with some minor variations. Under 
Utah law if the Philippine Will were probated here, the Will would be 
upheld according to its terms and distribution under the Will would be 
permitted even though it were contrary to the Utah law which would apply 
in the case of intestate succession. Section 75-2-602, Utah Code Annotat 
1953, as amended, provides that the meaning and legal effect of a disposi 
tion in a Will shall be determined by the local law of a particular state 
selected by the testator in his instrument unless the application of that 
WU1211(Rfr4t) 
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law is contrary to the provisions relating to the elective share of a 
surviving spouse. Under Section 75-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, if a 
married person domiciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse has a 
right of election to take in lieu of the Will an elective share equal 
to approximately one-third of the decedent's estate. If a married perse 
not domiciled in this state dies, the right, if any, of the surviving 
spouse to take an elective share is governed by the law of the decedent1 
domicile at death. No provision is made under Utah law for an elective 
share by children. Utah is not a community property state but would 
recognize community property acquired in another jurisdiction. Under 
Section 75-2-302 provision is made for pretermitted children if a testat 
fails to provide for them in his Will but this would not apply to the 
present estate because the decedent recognized the existence of all of 
his children. 
In answer to your question,Utah does not have compulsory heirs and exce] 
for the widow's one-third elective share a decedent can disinherit his h 
if he so desires. Under the Utah law of succession, if Mr. Grimm had 
died intestate, one-half of his estate would have passed to his widow ai 
the remaining one-half would have been divided -equally among his four 
children. It might further be noted at this point that the trust creat< 
by Mr. Grimm would have been recognized under Utah law as valid even 
though its provisions were contrary to the decedent's Will or the 
succession laws of the State of Utah. Utah would recognize the validit; 
of the trust as overriding the Will of the decedent unless it could be 
proved that the decedent was incompetent or acting under fraud or undue 
influence at the time the trust was executed. 
(GG) In answer to your principal inquiry under this section, it would 
appear that in view of Section 75-2-602 of the Utah law referred to abo 
that the dispositions by the decedent in his Philippine Will in accorda 
WUtt11(*«-M) 
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with Philippine law should be given effect since the decedent indicated 
in that document that the Philippine law should control. This should 
end the matter even though under Utah law the result might be different. 
(HH) I believe your inquiry under this section has already been answerec 
since Section 75-2-602 provides for the local law selected by the testate 
to govern. This section specifically refers to the law of a particular 
state but I believe the same rule would apply to the selection of the lav 
of a foreign country. It would therefore be my opinion that the Philippd 
Will should be governed by Philippine law even though inconsistent with 
the laws of the State of Utah because of the conflict of law rule referrc 
to above. Prior to the above referred code section, Utah would have adoj 
the common law rule that the law of the domicile controls the validity oi 
the Will and successional rights. 
(II) With respect to the legal effect of the trust agreement, both U. S, 
aftd Utah law would be the same as the Philippine law and include the 
assets of the trust in the estate for death tax purposes. However, as 
indicated above, under Utah law the assets of the trust would not be subj 
to collation in determining the compulsory share of the heirs. 
(JJ) As indicated above we will obtain an affidavit from Mr. King with 
respect to the date of the execution of the codicil and will send a copy 
of the codicil, certified by the Utah probate court, to you as soon as 
possible. 
In summary, I might suggest for your guidance the following feelings whi< 
I have after reading your cable: 
(1) I believe the Philippine Will should be offered for probate 
in the Philippines as soon as possible and that personal 
representatives should be appointed tl^ ere in accordance 
with the Will. 
WU1211(ftft-M) 
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(2) My principal concern about domicile relates to the 
high rate of taxation in the Philippines which we 
will probably not avoid as to a substantial portion 
of the property even by contesting the domicile. 
(3) Because of the condition of many of the assets and 
business interests perhaps you will be more successful 
in negotiating values for tax purposes in the 
Philippines than we would be in the U. S. 
(4) There may be some merit after considering all of the 
circumstances and discussing the matter with Mrs. 
Grimm to try to work out some settlement with the two 
daughters by the prior marriage as to the percentage 
of the Philippine estate in which they will be entitled 
to participate, particularly if the assets in the trust 
could be left intact. 
(5) Once the foregoing questions are resolved, it will be 
imperative to commence the preparation of an accurate 
inventory of the decedent's assets. 
I will anticipate having an opportunity in the near future to 
talk with you. 
David E. Salisbury 
WU 1211 (RI-70) 000036 
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Text of handwritten letter from Edward "Pete" Grimm to David 
Salisbury, dated March 29, 1978: 
David -
I have a question. As I understand it aren't the inheritance 
taxes dependent upon the amount the wife gets? (she gets hers, 
up to 50% of the estate, tax free - tax is then computed on the 
remainder. For the US, it is the marital deduction that allows 
this - in the PI, it is community property.) So how can you 
agree to split up an amount that can't be determined until you 
first know how it's going to be split up? 
Mother I'm sure is sending you a copy of Ethel's proposed 
agreement - it's like we mentioned, 25% of after-tax estate to 
her and Nita. Look at my chart (Rows 1-4) on line one - if the 
wife takes half, the total after-tax estate is maximized. However, 
under Ethel's plan, the wife doesn't get half - she and the other 
two children (Linda and I) combined get 4.88 (48%) of the original 
10. So the wife has to, subsequent to estate taxes, take .12 of 
the assets that were put into her name (so as to qualify for the 
marital deduction) and gift them to Ethel and Nita. 
Under your proposed 60/10/10/10/10 plan, (Rows 5-8) Ethel 
and Nita (Column 6) never get more than is available for the 
children (Column 4) - but they get the greatest portion of it. 
That's why I talked of some deal that splits up Column 4 -
the after-tax estate. 
The .75 isn't very much, but look what happens without the 
marital deduction - they get the same (Row 13). I'm having trouble 
with the rows and columns. 
Is that idea sound though? I'm assuming that the first wife 
has no claim on anything (it being 30 years now since the dissolu-
tion of that conjugal partnership). 
If Mom weren't around at all, they might hope for 50% of the 
after-tax estate, or 1.50 - but no more (Row 13). 
I can see that Linda and I might give up some of our portion 
of the children's share (Column 4) as the interest we would get 
in Mom's half is worth something. But I don't see why, as under 
Ethel's formulae, we should get only a future/hoped for interest 
in Mom's half - let alone the possibility that Mom might not even 
get her half. 
I haven't considered the effects of not reporting any portions 
of the estate. 
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I looked at a lot of other numbers, but nothing popped out. 
They probably look like yours. I figured the best they could do 
might be 2.6 of 10 - and that's high. The worst - nothing. 
I'm not sure what's fair - but I certainly don't like her 
scheme. 
If Ethel thought these numbers came from me I don't know that 
she'd even look at them. 
Thanks for all your help. 
(Signed) Pete 
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Mrs. Maxine T. Grimm 
Mr. Edward M. Grimm, II 
P. 0. Box 569 
Tooele, Utah 8407A 
Re: Estate of Edward M. Grimm, deceased. 
Dear Maxine and Pete: 
Attached hereto you will find a copy of a letter which I 
plan to send this date to all of the beneficiaries of the estate. 
After lengthy consideration, I have concluded that I can no longer 
effectively represent the estate on the basis that was originally 
contemplated and that you no longer wish me to do so. 
Early last year (1978), when I was engaged by you to render 
legal services for your husband's and father's estate, it was my 
understanding that our firm would represent the entire estate on 
a worldwide basis and would endeavor to handle matters relating 
to the estate in a way that would be beneficial to all of the 
beneficiaries. We realized in the beginning that there was a con-
flict between the various family interests, but following the sign-
ing of the Agreement of April 25, 1978 (the "Agreement"), we hoped 
that all of the beneficiaries would work together for their common 
interests to complete the administration and distribution of the 
•state. 
It has been apparent for many months that you, Maxine, both 
in your role as principal beneficiary, and as one of the personal 
representatives in both probate proceedings, have not wanted me and 
my law firm to function in that role. Contrary to my understand-
ing and that aet forth in the Agreement, you have not advised us 
or consulted with us concerning the hiring of accountants and 
attorneys or in connection with a number of important decisions 
and changes affecting the estate. It was, of course, contemplated 
that attorneys in other areas would be vital to the proper adminis-
tration of the estate. However, information vital to the estate 
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and to decisions affecting the estate have not been channeled 
through our firm and recommendations which we have made concern-
ing matters abroad have either been ignored or have not been 
followed. This places us in an untenable position with you and 
with the other beneficiaries who were given to believe that we 
would be coordinating the legal work involved in administering 
the estate. 
I believe that in many ways the estate has made considerable 
progress in the past 20 months that I have been associated with 
it. There are many important decisions now awaiting decisive 
action. Within the next few months, there will be many other 
important problems to solve and matters to be negotiated. Maybe 
it will not be possible for any one individual or firm to represent 
the estate but it will be vital if these matters are to be resolved 
without litigation cm every issue that the attorney for the estate 
have the confidence and support of all of the beneficiaries involved. 
I ^
 BOTTy t a a L this decision has been necessary. 1 have 
enjoyed my association with you and with the others involved in 
the estate and T certainly wish you well beyond this point. 
1 will submit a statement for our services which have not been 
billed and I will cooperate fully with whomever is selected to 
represent the estate, 
Very truly yours, 
DES/to David II Salisbury 
End. 
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April 6, 1978 
Mr. Rex Roberts 
Post Office Box 215 
Greenhills Post Office 
Rizal, Philippines 
Dear .M:i -. Roberts: 
As I have indicated to you by telephone, we have 
been negotiating with David Salisbury to obtain a stipulation 
in connection with the petition for probate pending before the 
Tooele County Court. After extensive discussions with Mr* 
Salisbury and consultation with Mr. Mike Matthews, we have 
entered into a stipulation, a copy of which is enclosed. As 
you will note, matters involving domicile and heirship will 
not be resolved by the court at this time. Nonetheless, we 
will plan to attend the court hearing to make sure there are 
no unexpected developments. 
Meanwhile, as I have indicated . . * -,- • Salisbury 
has expressed a desire to settle the case. 1 agret with him 
that if a satisfactory settlement could be reached, the parties 
would then be able to work together to obtain the best possible 
results under the tax laws and in ascertaining the existence 
and location of assets. However, Mr. Salisbury does not 
believe that the agreement contained in your letter of March 
31, 1978, sets forth his understanding of what is intended. 
The principal difference has to do with the xnarita] deduction. 
Mr. Salisbury believes that Maxine Tate Grimm should be entitled 
to claim a full marital deduction before estate taxes and the 
remainder of the estate after taxes would be divided equally 
among the four children. 
Mr. Salisbury has made a series of calculations under 
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various assumptions as to his view of how the estate would be 
divided in the absence of an agreement. There are a variety 
of issues involved in these assumptions, but they do present 
some indication of his thinking. 
From time to time we have been advised that your 
Philippine lawyers have researched the Philippine laws of 
succession. As soon as possible we would appreciate all the 
information they can provide on this subject. Also, it would 
be helpful to have your lawyers react to the calculations 
contained in connection with Mr. Salisbury's assumptions. 
Some of the other issues involved in the case 
include the question of domicile and the accompanying issues 
of succession and taxation. Another significant issue is 
community property ramifications, including determination of 
how much of the estate of the deceased has been accumulated 
since the second marriage. Another issue is the possibility 
of fraudulent concealment in connection with the divorce 
settlement of the first marriage. That issue would substantially 
affect the community property concepts. Relating to the issue 
of fraudulent concealment are such matters as the statute of 
limitations, laches, and complicated factual matters relating 
to the status of the property holdings cit the time of the 
divorce and whether there was in fact concealment. Another 
issue relates to the validity of the irrevocable trust and 
transfers into the trust. Another issue is whether certain 
property which is known to be in existence is to be included 
in the estate. Indeed, there are a variety of issues, both 
legal and factual relating to each principal issue, none of 
which has been developed to the point where we can present a 
concrete opinion. One fundamental issue, of course, concerns 
the assets of the estate and where the assets are located. 
These issues could either be resolved by factual and 
legal preparation and ultimate litigation, or any of them could 
be avoided as a practical matter through an agreement. At 
this time an agreement which would offer sufficient protection 
to your rights seems to be the best course of action. 
We have tentatively agreed to meet with Mr. Salisbury 
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on April 18 to discuss further settlement. I believe it 
would be well for you and Mr. Matthews tp attend the meeting 
in Salt Lake City. 
Sincarely yours, 
Donal^ B. Holbrook 
DBH/br 
Encl. 
cc: Mr. Michael Matthews 
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